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How Long Can This Go On?
The Controversy Over the Application
of the Statute of Limitations
to S Corporations and Their Shareholders
J. Marcus Sommers*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bufferd v. Commissioner,' the Supreme Court resolved the dis-
pute involving the proper application of the statute of limitations to an
S corporation and its shareholders.' Contrary to the holding of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kelley v. Commissioner, and the
argument made by several taxpayers, the Supreme Court ruled that the
statute of limitations for the assessment of tax against the shareholder
of an S corporation commences with the filing of that shareholder's
personal return." In so ruling, the Court agreed with the Fifth, Eleventh,
and Second Circuit Courts of Appeal.5
* The author is currently an associate with the St. Louis office of Bryan Cave.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Paul C. Feinberg, without
whom this article would not have been completed. The author also wishes to express
his appreciation for the helpful comments of Ms. Jean Jones, Ms. Paula Hosler, Pro-
fessor Chris Hoyt, Professor Patrick Randolph, Mr. Richard Smith, Ms. Diana Erbsen
and Mr. Jeff McFall.
1. 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993), affg 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992).
2. Id.
3. 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the statute of limitations barred the
Service's assessment to an S corporation shareholder after the statute of limitations
for the S corporation's return had expired). Kelley was cited with approval by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fendall v. Commissioner, 906 F.2d 362 (8th Cir.
1990).
4. Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 927.
5. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992); Fehhaber v. Commis-
sioner, 954 F.2d 653 (1lth Cir. 1992); Bufferd v. Commissioner, 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1992).
In general, section 6501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(hereinafter "the Code") provides that the Internal Revenue Service
(hereinafter "the Service") has three years from the time a return is
filed to assess a tax.7 This general rule applies to both individual and
corporate taxpayers. A dispute arose, however, about whether this
three year statute of limitations barred the Service from assessing a tax
against an S corporation shareholder, with respect to tax items
originally reported on the S corporation's return, after the expiration of
the statute of limitations for the S corporation's return.
This article critically examines the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Bufferd v. Commissioner,' as well as the reasoning of other courts on
this issue.' This article further examines how the reasoning of these
courts affects the general application of the statute of limitations for
assessments of tax by the Service. This analysis focuses on two distinct
issues: (1) whether the language of the Code requires the return of an S
corporation to be treated as a "return" within the meaning of section
6501(a) of the Code; 0 and (2) the proper application of the statute of
limitations provision."
This article begins by discussing the general tax concepts that are
encountered in analyzing the foregoing issues.'2 Next, the article briefly
considers the rules of statutory construction to determine how the
statutory language and the legislative history should be used to
interpret the statutes.'" The article then focuses on the interaction of
code sections 6012 and 6037(a) as they apply to the statute of lim-
itations for assessment defined in code section 6501(a). 4 Included in
the discussion of the statutory provisions is an examination of their
6. All section references in the article, unless otherwise indicated, are to the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986 (hereinafter "the Code") as amended.
7. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1993). Section 6501(a) states:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the
amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years
after the return was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after
the date prescribed) or, if the tax is payable by stamp, at any time after
such tax became due and before the expiration of 3 years after the date on
which any part of such tax was paid, and no proceeding in court without
assessment for the collection of such tax shall be begun after the expiration
of such period.
8. 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993).
9. Green, 963 F.2d at 783; Fehlhaber, 954 F.2d at 653; Bufferd, 952 F.2d at 675;
Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d at 756 (9th Cir. 1989).
10. See infra notes 122-84 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 306-31 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 18-98 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 99-121 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 122-58 and accompanying text.
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legislative history.5 After analyzing the law and the legislative history,.
the article examines how the courts interpret and apply the law in this
controversial setting.6 Finally, this article discusses the policy con-
cerns raised by this dispute. 7
A. Tax Years
To fully grasp the nature of the dispute, it is necessary to understand
the two alternative taxable years that a taxpayer may adopt because of
the significant tax ramifications which arise from such selection.
1. Calendar Year
A "calendar year" taxpayer has a taxable year that begins on January
1 and ends on December 31."8 The taxpayer reports all items of tax (in-
come, deductions, etc.) for the taxable year on his applicable return. 9
In the case of an individual, the return must be filed by the April 15
following the end of the calendar year.' In the case of a "calendar year
corporation," the return must be filed by the March 15 following the
end of the calendar year.2' After the filing of a tax return, the Service
generally has three years to make assessments of tax with respect to
15. See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 185-331 and accompanying text
17. See injfra notes 332-55 and accompanying text.
18. *See I.R.C. § 441(d) (1993). Section 441(d) states: "For purposes of the subtitle,
the term 'calendar year' means a period of 12 months ending on December 31." Id.
19. Id. § 6012(a)(1)(A) (1993). Section 6012(a)(1)(A) requires an individual to file a
return. Section 6012(a)(1)(A) states: "Returns with respect to income taxes under
subtitle A shall be made by the following: (1)(A) Every individual having for the tax-
able year gross income which equals or exceeds the exemption amount . . . ." Id.
20. Id. § 6072(a). I.R.C. Section 6072(a) states in relevant part: "In the case of
returns under section 6012, 6013,. 6017, or 6031 (relating to income tax under subtitle
A), . . . returns made on the basis of a fiscal year shall be filed on or before the
15th day of the fourth month following the close of the fiscal year ..... Id.
21. Id. § 6072. Section 6072(b) provides:
Returns of corporations under section 6012 made on the basis of the
calendar year shall be filed on or before the 15th day of March following the
close of the calendar year, and such returns made on the basis of a fiscal
year shall be filed on or before the 15th day of the third month following
the close of the fiscal year. Returns required for a taxable year by section
6011(e)(2) (relating to returns of a DISC) shall be filed on or before the
fifteenth day of the ninth month following the close of the taxable year.
Id.
that return.' If the Service attempts to make an assessment after three
years, the taxpayer may raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense.'
2. Fiscal Year
A "fiscal year taxpayer" has a taxable year that ends on the last day
of any calendar month other than December.' For example, a taxpayer
with a taxable year beginning on September 1 and ending on August 31
would be a fiscal year taxpayer. Most fiscal year taxpayers are not
individuals. A "fiscal year corporation" must file a tax returno that
reports the corporation's tax items at the end of its fiscal year.' As
with a calendar year taxpayer, the Service may be barred from making
assessments of tax with respect to that return three years after the
return is filed."7
B. Pass-Through Entities
Every entity required by the Code to file a return is not necessarily
required to pay tax. The Code requires that partnerships and S corpo-
rations file partnership' and -corporate tax returns," respectively.
However, these business organizations generally do not pay tax at the
partnership' or corporate3' level. Instead, the tax items of the part-
22. Id. § 6051(a); see supra note 7 for applicable text.
23. I.R.C. sections 1311-1315 provide for adjustments to a taxpayer's liability in
certain limited situations even though the determination would otherwise be prevent-
ed by operation of, law. Generally, the limited situations could, but do not necessari-
ly, arise in the dispute addressed in this article. For purposes of this article, it is as-
sumed that the situations involving the application of Code §§ 1311-1315 do not arise.
24. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(24) (1993). Section 77601(a)(24) states: "When used in this ti-
tle, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the
intent thereof ... [t]he term 'fiscal year' means an accounting period of 12 months
ending on the last day of any month other than December." Id.
25. Id. § 6012(a)(2) (1993); see i4fra text accompanying note 129 for text.
26. The return of a fiscal year corporate taxpayer must be filed within the time
constraints proscribed by I.R.C. section 6072(b) (1993); see supra note 21 for text
27. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1993); see supra note 7 for text.
28. I.R.C. § 6031(a) (1993) (partnerships); see iqfra note 142 for text.
29. I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993) (S corporations); see infra text accompanying note 140
for text.
30. I.R.C. § 701 (1993). Section 701 provides that "[a] partnership as such shall not
be subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business
as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capaci-
ties." Id.
31. Id. § 1363(a). Section 1363 states in relevant part that "[eixcept as otherwise
provided in this subchapter, an S corporation shall not be subject to the taxes im-
posed by this chapter." Id.
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nership or the S corporation are reported on the return of each
individual partner' or shareholder.' Because tax items of the S
corporation or partnership are "passed through" the business entity and
reported on the return of the individual shareholder or partner, S
corporations and partnerships are called "pass-through entities." The
tax items of a "pass-through entity" are reported twice-first by the
pass-through entity filing its tax return, and again when each partner or
shareholder declares his share of the pass-through entity's income or
loss on his individual return.
The dispute surrounding the filing of the tax return for an S corpora-
tion or a partnership is whether the business return or the sharehold-
er/partner return, starts the Service's three year limitation period for
making assessments of tax attributable to income, deductions or other
information reportable by the business.' More precisely, the issue is
whether the Service is barred from making assessments to the indi-
vidual tax return relating to tax items first reported on the S corpora-
tion or partnership return after the three year statute of limitations
period for the business return expires.
1. Corporate Taxation: An Overview
A corporation comes into existence upon the filing of its articles of
incorporation with a state.' The corporation is a separate legal entity,
32. See I.R.C. § 701 (1993);.see supra note 30 for text.
33. Id. § 1366(a). Section 1366(a), which establishes the income of a shareholder
in an S corporation, provides:
In determining the tax under this chapter of a shareholder for the
shareholder's taxable year in which the taxable year of the S corporation
ends (or for the final taxable year of a shareholder who dies before the end
of the corporation's taxable year), there shall be taken into account the
shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's-
(A) items of income (including tax-exempt income), loss, deduction or
credit the separate treatment of which could affect the liability for tax of any
shareholder, and
(B) nonseparately computed income or loss.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the items referred to in sub-
paragraph (A) shall include amounts described in paragraph (4) or (6) of sec-
tion 702(a).
34. See, e.g., Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1990), affd, 954 F.2d 653
(lth Cir. 1992); see also Siben v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1991).
35. See 3 ZoLMAN CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAx PLANNING
§ 51.02[21[a](1) (1991).
a new legal "person." This new legal person can enter into contracts,
sue or be sued, and pay taxes.'
The corporation must file a tax return at the end of its taxable
year." The corporation selects the date that marks the end of the
corporation's taxable year.' If the date that represents the end of the
selected taxable year is December 31, the corporation is a calendar year
taxpayer.' If the corporation selects the last day of any other calendar
month to mark the end of its taxable year, the corporation is a fiscal
year taxpayer.4"
2. C Corporations
A "regular" or "C corporation"4' pays tax on its income.42 If the
corporate earnings are distributed to the shareholders in the form of
dividends, the shareholders pay a tax on these receipts. 4' This is the
concept of "double taxation of corporate income." One tax is paid by a
corporation on its income and a second tax is paid by the shareholder
when the corporation distributes its after-tax income to the shareholder
as a dividend.'4 This "double taxation" is the primary disadvantage of
using the "C corporation" as a method of conducting business.
3. S Corporations
Congress enacted Subchapter S of the Code to ameliorate the harsh
tax consequences of operating a small business as a corporation.4 Sub-
chapter S allows "qualifying small businesses" to elect to be taxed ac-
36. Id. § 50.03[1].
37. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(2) (1993); see in(fra text accompanying note 129 for text.
38. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-IT(b)(2) (as amended in 1987). Regulation 1.441-
IT(b)(2) states: "A new taxpayer adopts a taxable year on or before the time pie-
scribed by law (not including extensions) for the filing of the taxpayer's first return
and may adopt, without prior approval, any taxable year that satisfies the require-
ments of section 441 and this section." Id.
39. See I.R.C. § 441(d) (1993); see supra note 18 for text.
40. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(24) (1993); see supra note 24 for text.
41. A "regular" or "C corporation" is any corporation that has not properly elected
to be an S corporation.
42. I.R.C. § 11 (1993). Section 11 states: "A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable
year on the taxable income of every corporation." Id.
43. Id. § 61(a)(7).
44. Consider this example: X corporation, a calendar year taxpayer, earned taxable
income of $1,000 in 1991. Also in 1991, X corporation paid a $100 dividend to its
shareholder A. X corporation is required to pay tax on $1,000 of income for 1991
despite X's payment of $100 to A as a dividend. In addition, A is required to pay tax
on the $100 dividend.
45. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
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cording to the rules of Subchapter S instead of being taxed like a C
corporation." A "qualifying small business"47 that elects to be taxed
pursuant to Subchapter S is known as an "S corporation."
Generally, an S corporation does not pay income tax at the corporate
level.4 Instead, the tax items of the S corporation pass through to the
shareholders." In effect, it is as if the corporation does not exist and
the shareholder earns the income or sustains the loss. Therefore, the
investors in an S corporation are entitled to the protections offered by
state corporation law, such as limited liability, without incurring the
disadvantage of double taxation discussed above.
Similar to a C corporation, the S corporation files a return at the end
of its tax year.' After the S corporation files its return, it sends each
shareholder a Form K-i,5' which provides information that must be
included on the shareholder's individual return.'
Because the S corporation files its tax return after the close of its
taxable year,' the shareholder reports the S corporation tax items on
his individual return after the close of the S corporation's taxable year.
If the S corporation's taxable year ends on the same day as the
shareholder's taxable year, there is a one month delay between the S
corporation's filing date of March 15 and the shareholder's' filing date of
April 15.' If the S corporation's taxable year ends on a different day
than the shareholder's taxable year, the delay between the filing of the
S corporation return and the shareholder's return is greater than one
46. See I.R.C. § 1363(a) (1993); see supra note 31 for text.
47. I.R.C. § 1361(b) (1993). A small business corporation is allowed to make an S
corporation election if it meets the requirements of section 1361(b), which provides:
For purposes of this subchapter, the term "small business corporation" means
a domestic corporation which is not an ineligible corporation and which does
not-
(A) have more than 35 shareholders,
(B) have as a shareholder a person (other than an estate and other than
a trust described in subsection (c)(2)) who is not an individual,
(C) have nonresident alien as a shareholder, and
(D) have more than 1 class of stock.
Id.
48. See id. § 1363(a); see supra note 31 for text.
49. I.R.C. § 1366(a); see supra note 33 for text.
50. I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993); see infra text accompanying note 140 for text.
51. I.R.S Tax Info. Publication 589 (1991).
52. See I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1993); see supra note 33 for text.
53. I.R.C. § 6072(b) (1993); see supra note 21 for text.
54. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
month.'
Because the S corporation shareholder does not pay tax on the S cor-
poration income until that income is reported on the shareholder's re-
turn, the shareholder delays paying the tax due on that income. This
delay is known as "tax deferral." Tax deferral is beneficial because it
allows the taxpayer, rather than the government, to earn investment
income on the delayed payment.
4. The Dispute: The Statute of Limitations and the Returns
of an S Corporation and Their Shareholders
The issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run on S corpo-
ration tax items becomes particularly significant in two situations. The
first situation concerns S corporation shareholders who wish to take
advantage of the economic benefits of tax deferral. The second situa-
tion concerns the audit of a shareholder in an S corporation. Often,
when conducting an audit, the Service will seek the taxpayer's permis-
sion to extend the statute of limitations on the tax items reported on
his individual return. 7 If the taxpayer is an S corporation shareholder,
the extension of the statute of limitations for the individual shareholder
does not extend the statute of limitations for the S corporation tax
items.' In either situation, if the statute of limitations begins with the
filing of the S corporation return, the Service is barred from making an
assessment with respect to the S corporation tax items reported on the
S corporation's or the shareholder's return after the statute of limita-
tions for the S corporation return has expired.'
55. For example, if an S corporation's taxable year ended March 31, 1990, its tax
return would be due June 15, 1990. The shareholder would not report the S
corporation's income on his/her individual income tax return until filing an individual
return for the taxable year ending December 31, 1990 on April 15, 1991. Ten months
would elapse between the time when the items were first reported on the S
corporation's tax return and the time when they would be reported on the
shareholder's individual return.
56. See supra section I(B)(3).
57. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4) (1993). Section 6501(c)(4) states:
Where, before the expiration of the time prescribed in this section for
the assessment of any tax imposed by this title, except the estate tax provid-
ed in chapter 11, both the Secretary and the taxpayer have consented in
writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at any
time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed
upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the
expiration of the period previously agreed upon.
Id.
58. See Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989).
59. Id.; but see Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993), offg 952 F.2d 675
(2d Cir. 1992); Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992); Fehlhaber v.
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To elaborate, the S corporation has a two-tiered reporting system.
The S corporation files a return that reports items such as income and
deductions for the S corporation.' The shareholder includes his share
of the S corporation items when he files his individual tax return.6 Be-
cause the S corporation return is filed before the shareholder's return,
the statute of limitations for the S corporation return expires before
that of the shareholder's. For a period of time, the Service can continue
to make assessments with respect to the shareholder's return, but not
the S corporation's return. If the S corporation return starts the statute
of limitations running, the Service should not be able to adjust the S
corporation tax items reported on the shareholder's return after the
statute of limitations on the S corporation return has expired, even if
the Service can adjust other tax items on the shareholder's return unre-
lated to the S corporation.
If the Service is allowed to make assessments regarding the S corpo-
ration items on the shareholder's return, the Service is, in effect, mak-
ing assessments attributable to items reported on the S corporation re-
turn after the expiration of the three year limitation period. Because the
tax items of an S corporation are also reported on the shareholder's
return, an adjustment to the S corporation's tax return results in a cor-
responding adjustment to the shareholder's tax items. In reverse, if the
Service adjusts the S corporation tax items on an individual
shareholder's return, it has, in effect, made an adjustment to the S cor-
poration return. Therefore, if the Service makes an assessment with
respect to the S corporation items reported on a shareholder's return
after the statute of limitations for the S corporation's return has run,
the Service effectively extends the statute of limitations for the S corpo-
ration return.'
As an illustration, consider the following example. Assume that X is
an S corporation with two equal shareholders, A and B. X's taxable year
ends August 31, 1990, and X files a timely return on November 15, 1990.
A and B are calendar year taxpayers whose returns are due on April 15,
Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992).
60. I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993); see inftn text accompanying note 140 for text.
61. I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1993); see supra note 33 for text.
62. This scenario can also result in unequal tax treatment for shareholders in the
same S corporation. If the Service makes an assessment attributable to an S corpo-
ration tax item on one shareholder's return, but fails to make an assessment of tax
for the same item on other shareholders' tax returns, similarly situated taxpayers
have inequitable tax liabilities for the same tax items.
1991. When A and B file their tax returns, their returns will reflect the
income and deductions passed through from X corporation. The Service
determines that X corporation should have reported $10,000 more in
taxable income or disallows a $10,000 deduction. The Service issues a
notice of deficiency on February 1, 1994. The notice is issued more than
three years after X corporation filed its return, but less than three years
after the shareholders, A and B, filed their returns. So, while the statute
of limitations on the return filed by X corporation has expired, A and B
may each be required to pay tax on an additional $5,000 of income at-
tributable to X corporation.
The Service takes the position that the S corporation return, filed
pursuant to section 6037, is an "informational return" that does not trig-
ger the running of the statute of limitations.' According to this reason-
ing, it is not until the shareholders report the S corporation tax items
on their personal returns that the statute of limitations begins to run. If
the Service, therefore, makes an assessment of tax related to an item
reported on an individual's return within the three year limitations peri-
od, the assessment is valid even if it relates to an item of tax first re-
ported on the S corporation return.
Many taxpayers have argued, however, that a better interpretation of
the statutory language of section 6037 is that the S corporation return is
the type of return that starts the statute of limitations running.' If the
S corporation's return starts the statute of limitations running, the Ser-
vice is barred from making an assessment attributable to S corporation
tax items on a shareholder's return after the statute of limitations on
the S corporation return expires.' This interpretation, in effect, pre-
vents the Service from making assessments that relate to S corporation
items on the shareholder's tax return even though the three year limita-
tion period for assessment on the shareholder's tax items unrelated to
the S corporation has not expired.
C. The Case Law
The issue of whether the S corporation's return starts the statute of
limitations running against the Service or whether the statute of limita-
tions begins only with the filing of the shareholder's return was first
addressed by the Tax Court in Leonhart v. Commissioner.' In
63. Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989), action on decision, 1986-
405 (Apr. 8, 1991).
64. See, e.g., Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1990), ffd, 954 F.2d 653
(11th Cir. 1992).
65. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1993); see supra note 7 for text.
66. 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 443 (1968), affd per curiam on other issues, 414 F.2d 749
(4th Cir. 1969).
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Leonhart, the Service issued a notice of deficiency to two shareholders
of an S corporation. 7 The shareholders claimed that the Service was
barred from making assessments on those tax items that were attribut-
able to the S corporation because the statute of limitations for the S
corporation's return had already expired.' The shareholders argued
that the return filed by the S corporation, as required by section
6037(a),M started the three year statute of limitation for assessment
prescribed in section 6501(a).70
The Tax Court reasoned that because S corporations do not pay tax,
there is no event which trigger's the running of the statute of limita-
tions.7' In interpreting section 6037(a), the Tax Court relied on a piece
of legislative history relating to the return requirement of section
6037.72 The Tax Court concluded that Congress intended the S
corporation's return to start the statute of limitations only if the
corporation's subchapter S status were later revoked.'
The Tax Court did not reexamine the issue of whether the S corpora-
tion return triggers the section 6501(a) statute of limitations until 1986,
with the case of Kelley v. Commissioner.' In Kelley, the Service disal-
lowed an S corporation deduction and assessed additional tax liability
on the individual shareholders after the three year statute of limitations
had run on the S corporation return.' The Tax Court once again af-
firmed the Service's determination.'6 The Tax Court noted that the stat-
ute of limitations could not start with the filing of the S corporation
return because the S corporation was not assessed any tax. ' The Tax
Court cited Leonhart and United States v. Adams Building CompanyM
to support its position that the filing of the S corporation return starts
67. Id. at 444.
68. Id. at 462.
69. For the text of I.R.C. § 6037(a) see infra text accompanying note 140.
70. See Leonhart, 27 T.C.M at 462. For the text of I.R.C. § 6501(a) see supra note
7.
71. See Leonhart, 27 T.C.M. at 462.
72. See id. at 462-63. This passage of legislative history was also ielied on by the
Tax Court and the Eleventh Circuit in Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1989)
oWfd, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992). See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text.
73. See Leonhart, 27 T.C.M. at 462.
74. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 313 (1986).
75. Id. at 314.
76. Id. at 315.
77. Id. at 314.
78. 531 F.2d 342, 343 (6th Cir. 1976).
the statute of limitations running only when the S corporation status is
later revoked.' The Tax Court again quoted the legislative history previ-
ously cited in Leonhart.° On the heels of Kelley, the Tax Court decid-
ed the case of Jacobsson v. Commissioner.8' Predictably, the Tax
Court relied on Leonhart, Kelley, and the legislative history to find
against the taxpayer."
In 1989, the Ninth Circuit reopened what appeared to be a closed
issue by overturning the Tax Court's decision in Kelley v. Commission-
er.' The Ninth Circuit reasoned that section 6037(a) required the Ser-
vice to treat an S corporation return as a return that started the statute
of limitations period.' The court noted that the purpose of a statute of
limitations was to close the books on a tax year.' The court observed
that the Service would not be prejudiced by having the statute of limita-
tions run with the filing of the corporate return because the Service
could request that the corporation extend its limitation period.' The
Ninth Circuit ruled that the Tax Court erred in interpreting the legisla-
tive history as requiring the Service to treat the S corporation return as
starting the statute of limitations only when the S election is later de-
termined to be invalid.8' The Ninth Circuit also noted that the section
6501(a) statute of limitations does not start running when tax is as-
sessed, but rather with the filing of "some return." '
In light of the Ninth's Circuit's decision, the Tax Court reconsidered
its interpretation of sections 6037(a) and 6501(a) in Fehlhaber v. Com-
missioner.' The Tax Court chose not to follow the Ninth Circuit
and reaffirmed its own interpretation of the legislative history of sec-
79. Kelley, 52 T.C.M. at 314.
80. Id. at 314-15.
81. 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1043 (1986) (holding that the Service could assess a share-
holder of an S corporation for items reported on the S corporation return, after the
statute of limitations on the S corporation return expired).
82. Id. at 1044.
83. 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989), action on decision, 1986-405 (Apr. 8, 1991).
84. 877 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1989).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. 94 T.C. 863 (1990).
90. The Tax Court observed that the appeal in the Fehlhaber case would lie within
the Eleventh Circuit and, citing Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd,
445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), decided not to follow the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Kelley v. Commissioner. In Golsen, the Tax Court ruled that the law applied to a dis-
pute would be the law of the circuit court of appeals hearing the case. Since this
case would be a case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the Tax Court was
allowed the discretion of a similarly situated district court.
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tion 6037 first put forth in Leonhart9' The Tax Court cited as addition-
al authority a passage from the legislative history of the unified assess-
ment provisions enacted by Congress in 1982.' In that passage Con-
gress commented on how under "present law," which was section 6037,
the statute of limitations applied at the individual level.' The Tax
Court also addressed the policy concerns of the Ninth Circuit and
found them unpersuasive. 4
A Clear split in the circuit courts of appeal was created when the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision in Fehlhaber.' The
Fifth and Second Circuits issued opinions concerning section 6037 that
aligned them with the Eleventh Circuit and the Tax Court.' The Eighth
Circuit favored the result reached by the Ninth Circuit." Recognizing a
split in the circuit courts of appeal on this issue, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to the Second Circuit case and resolved the dispute
in favor of the Service.'
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The first step in construing a statute is to look at its plain lan-
guage.' No other rules of statutory construction are applied unless a
court determines that the meaning of the plain language of the statute
is ambiguous."° However, a court's proper role is to determine what
effect to give to the language of the legislature.' Thus, if the court
finds that the plain language of a statute is "ambiguous," or its applica-
tion would clearly violate legislative intent, the court may look beyond
91. Fehlhaber, 94 T.C. at 867.
92. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982).
93. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982).
94. Id. at 869-70.
95. Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992), affg 94 T.C. 863
(1990).
96. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992); Bufferd v. Commissioner,
952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992)
97. Fendall v. Commissioner, 906 F.2d 362, 364 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Kelly v.
Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989)) (holding that the Service can not make
assessments on beneficiaries of a trust relating to trust tax items after the statute of
limitations for making assessments to the trust have run).
98. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993).
99. 1 JACOB MERTENS, JR., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 3.05 (rev.
ed. 1993).
100. Id. § 3.07.
101. Id. § 3.01.
the language of the statute." The first source beyond the statutory
language to which a court looks to determine the intent of the legisla-
ture is the committee reports.'" If the committee reports are silent or
confusing as to the legislative intent, a court may look to other docu-
ments of the legislative history such as congressional debates and com-
ments made by individual senators."°
If a court cannot adequately discern legislative intent from the statu-
tory language or the legislative history, it then applies the rule of con-
struction for ambiguity."x Note that the rule of construction for ambi-
guity is applied only after concluding that the statutory language and
the legislative history do not adequately reveal the legislative intent un-
derlying the statute under construction. The standard rule that applies
to taxing statutes has been that any ambiguity in the statute should be
construed "against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.""
The policy behind this rule has been that taxation is a creature of leg-
islation, and thus, the meaning of statutes should not be extended "be-
yond the clear impact of the language used." 7
This rule is tempered by the realistic notion that tax statutes are in-
tended to generate revenue.'" In line with that notion, construction of
statutes defining income are construed liberally to tax all possible
sources of revenue."' Deductions and exemptions, provided by legisla-
tive grace, have been construed narrowly to prevent the escape of legit-
imate revenue." However, courts often apply the rule that ambiguity
in taxing statutes be construed "against the government and in favor of
the taxpayer""' when interpreting statutes of limitation."' This is
102. Id. § 3.07.
103. Id. § 3.01.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 3.47.
106. 3A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 66.01 (5th ed.
1992). "It is a settled rule that tax laws are to be strictly construed against the state
and in favor of the taxpayer." Id.; see also MERTENS, supra note 99, § 3.01. But see
MERTENS, supra note 99, § 57.03, which notes a trend toward the position that "stat-
utes of limitations barring assessment and collection of taxes justly due and unpaid
receives a strict construction in favor of the government."
107. See 3A SINGER, supra note 106, § 66.Oi (citing Helvering v. Stockholms
Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1934)); see also MERTENS, supra note 99, § 3.32.
108. MERTENS, supra note 99, § 3.47.
109. Id.
110. Id. §§ 3.49 & 3.50.
111. Id. § 3.31 (citing Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93-94
(1934)).
112. See Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 350 (1927).
But see MICHAEL I. SALTzMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5.01 (2d ed. 1991).
Saltzman states: "Statutes of limitations on assessment and collection are construed
strictly in favor of the government, because, as the Supreme Court has said, 'the
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counter to the normal rule applied when interpreting nontax statutes,
which is that "limitations upon action by the United States are con-
strued strictly in favor of the government.""'
However, in 1984, the Supreme Court decided the case of Badaracco
v. Commissioner."' In Badaracco, the Court clearly extended the gen-
eral rule that statutes of limitation are to be construed strictly in favor
of the government when interpreting ambiguous tax statutes."5 Since
then, courts at all levels, including the Tax Court, have cited Badaracco
when construing statutes of limitation for tax statutes strictly in favor
of the government."'
One problem with the rule adopted by the Supreme Court and other
courts that have followed Badaracco is that the rule relies on the Su-
preme Court case Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Davis."7
Dupont was not a tax case, rather it involved a suit by a railroad
against the United States to recover demurrage charges that accrued on
a shipment made by the railroad."8 Because Dupont is not a tax case,
the Supreme Court's reliance on Dupont is suspect, especially consider-
ing the existence of a line of authority which offers a rule counter to
the one adopted by the Supreme Court in Badaracco."9 The issue of
how ambiguity in tax statutes is to be construed in light of
public interest should not be prejudiced by the default or negligence of public offi-
cers." Id. (citing Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 350
(1927)). However, the Bowers court continued by stating: "The provision is part of a
taxing statute, and such laws are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpay-
ers." Bowers, 273 U.S. at 350. The Bowers court applied the rule that, for taxing
statutes, the statutes of limitation should be "interpreted liberally in favor of the
taxpayers" in deciding the outcome of that case. Id. It seems the Bowers court took
notice of the general rule that the construction of statutes of limitation should be
construed in favor of the government and then modified or created an exception to
this rule when applying the statute of limitations for tax statutes. See Dupont de
Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 468 (1924).
113. MERTENS, supra note 99, § 3.55.
114. 464 U.S. 386 (1984).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1990). But see Larotonda v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 287, 292 (1987) (citing Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. at
93-94, with approval and stating that "doubts are to be resolved against the govern-
ment and in favor of the taxpayer").
117. Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 391-92 (citing Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264
U.S. 456, 458 (1924)).
118. Dupont, 264 U.S. at 459.
119. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
Badaracco"2 ' is a vast issue beyond the scope of this article. Further-
more, an examination of the congressional intent derived from the stat-
utory language and legislative history of section 6037 may eliminate the
need to consider which rule of construction for ambiguous statutes
should be applied. 2'
III. THE SECTION 6501 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE RETURNS
REQUIRED BY SECTIONS 6012 AND 6037.
A. Overview
If the unified assessment provisions of the Code do not apply,"
then the statute of limitations set forth in code section 6501(a) governs
the Service's ability to assess tax against the S corporation."n Section
6501(a) provides that the three year statute of limitations commences
120. Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 391-92.
121. See infra notes 122-84 and accompanying text.
122. The two possible statutes of limitation on tax return assessments that could
apply to an S corporation are § 6501(a) and § 6229(a). Section 6229(a), which is part
of the unified assessment provisions for partnerships, was made applicable to S
corporations with the passage of Public Law 97-354. See Subchapter S Revisions Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1697 (1982). Section 6229(a) provides that
the statute of limitations will begin to run with the filing of the S corporation return.
See I.R.C. § 6229(a) (1993). Courts have consistently interpreted section 6229(a) as
preventing an assessment on the shareholder's return (or partner's return) after the
statute of limitations on the S corporation return (or partnership return) has expired.
See, e.g., Amesbury Apartments Ltd. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 227 (1990).
The unified assessment provisions must be applied to all S corporation returns
filed after the effective date of their enactment. See, e.g., Sparks v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 1279 (1987). However, there are two major exceptions to the application of the
unified assessment provisions. The first exception is by notice. See I.R.C. § 6231(b)
(1993). Exception by notice occurs when the Service sends the taxpayer a notice
stating that all S corporation items will be treated as individual items. Id. The second
exception is the small business exception. In 1987, the Service issued Temporary
Treasury Regulation 301.6241-1T(c), which states that S corporations with 5 or fewer
shareholders are excepted from the unified assessment provisions. Prior to the pro-
mulgation of the treasury regulation, the parameters of the small business exception
had been litigated. For purposes of this article, it is assumed that the unified assess-
ment provisions do not apply.
123. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1993). Section 6501(a) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax
imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was
filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed)
or, if the tax is payable by stamp, at any times after such tax became due
and before the expiration of 3 years after the date on which any part of
such tax was paid, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the
collection of such tax shall be begun after the expirations of such period.
Id.
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with the filing of a "return.""4 Generally, pursuant to section
6012(a)(2), a corporation is required to file a return.'26 An S corpora-
tion that is not required to file a return pursuant to section 6012(a)(2)
is required to file a return pursuant to code section 6037(a). 2 ' The
Service takes the position that an S corporation return filed pursuant to
section 6037(a) is not a return for purposes of section 6501(a), and thus
does not start the running of the section 6501 statute of limitations.'27
To examine the interaction of code sections 6037, 6012, and 6501 as
they apply to S corporations, it is useful to look first at how these sec-
tions apply to C corporations.
B. The Section 6012 Return Requirement
1. C Corporations
Pursuant to code section 6012, individuals, corporations, estates, and
trusts must file a tax return." Specifically, section 6012(a)(2), as it is
relevant to corporations, states that "[r]eturns with respect to income
taxes under subtitle A shall be made by the following:... (2) Every
corporation subject to taxation under subtitle A."" When a corpora-
tion files a timely return pursuant to section 6012(a)(2), it is deemed to
have filed a return for section 6501(a) purposes and the Service has
three years from the date this return is filed to make assessments
against the corporation. The Commissioner and the taxpayer may ex-
124. Id.
125. Id. § 6012(a)(2). See infra text accompanying note 129.
126. I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993). For the text of § 6037(a), see inf'ra text accompanying
note 140.
127. See, e.g., Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1990).
128. I.R.C. § 6012 (1993). Section 6012 states in relevant part:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Returns with respect to income taxes under sub-
title A shall be made by the following:
(1)(a) Every individual having for the taxable year gross income which
equals or exceeds the exemptions amount . . .
(2) Every corporation subject to taxation under subtitle A;
(3) Every estate the gross income of which for the taxable year is
$600 or more.
(4) Every trust having for the taxable year any taxable income, or
having gross income of $600 or over, regardless of the amount of taxable
income.
Id.
129. Id. § 6012(a)(2).
tend the statute of limitations by mutual agreement."" If this extension
agreement is not made, however, the Service is barred from assessing
tax against the corporation three years after the return is filed.'3'
2. S Corporations
An S corporation, which is not usually a tax paying entity," incurs
tax liability at the corporate level in only a few circumstances. The
Code, levies a corporate tax on an S corporation for built-in gains on
the appreciated assets of the corporation at the time of the S elec-
tion,'" for excessive passive investment income,"M and for LIFO recap-
130. Id. § 6501(c)(4). Section 6501(c)(4), which states:
Where, before the expiration of the time prescribed in this section for
the assessment of any tax imposed by this title, except the estate tax pro-
vided in chapter 11, both the Secretary and the taxpayer have consented in
writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at any
time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed
upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the
expiration-of the period previously agreed upon.
Id.
131. Id. § 6501(a). See supra note 123 for text.
132. I.R.C. § 1363(a) (1993). Section 1363(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided
in this subchapter, an S corporation shall not be subject to the taxes imposed by
this chapter." Id.
133. Id. § 1374(a). Section 1374 provides: "If for any taxable year beginning in the
recognition period an S corporation has a net recognized built-in gain, there is hereby
imposed a tax (computed under subsection (b)) on the income of such corporation
for such taxable year." Id.
Section 1374(a) affects C corporations that have made the S election. Often a C
corporation will depreciate assets resulting in their fair market value being consider-
ably above their tax base. Congress thought that some corporations may try to avoid
or defer the payment of tax on the large gains that would result from the sale of
those assets by making the S election. Thus this tax could be avoided at the corpo-
rate level, because, absent this section, a liquidating distribution of an asset is not
taxable to a corporation after the S election. 2 EDWIN T. HOOD & JOHN J. MYLAN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS, § 24.22 (1991).
134. I.R.C. § 1375(a) (1993). Section 1375(a) states:
If for the taxable year an S corporation has-
(1) subchapter C earnings and profits at the close of such taxable year,
and
(2) gross receipts more than 25 percent of which are passive investment
income,
then there is hereby imposed a tax on the income of such corporation
for such taxable year. Such tax shall be computed by multiplying the excess
net passive income by the highest rate of tax specified in section 11(b).
Id.
Section 1375(a) also applies to C corporations that have made the S election. Its
purpose is to force corporations that have significant passive investment income to pay
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ture. '35 It is important to note that the sections that impose the tax for
these items are in Subtitle A of the Code. Thus, an S corporation that is
required to pay tax under one of these provisions is: (1) a corporation
and (2) subject to taxation under Subtitle A. The language of 6012(a)(2)
demands that the S corporation file a tax return.
Any return filed by a corporation pursuant to section 6012(a)(2) is a
"return" under section 6501(a).'" The filing of that "return" starts a
three year statute of limitations period after which the Service may not
make any assessments of tax."' Thus, when the S corporation incurs
tax liability at the corporate level, the S corporation's return is the re-
turn that starts the statute of limitations running.'"
C. The Section 6037 Return Requirement
An S corporation that is not subject to taxation under Subtitle A is
still required to file a tax return pursuant to code section 6037(a),"
out any retained earnings that the corporation has left from when it was a C corpora-
tion. 2 HOOD & MYLAN, supra note 133, § 24:24.
135. I.R.C. § 1363(d)(1) (1993). Section 1363(d)(1) states that if:
(A) an S corporations was a C corporation for the last taxable year
before the first taxable year for which the election under section 1362(a) was
effective, and
(B) the corporation inventoried goods under the LIFO method for such
last taxable year,
the LIFO recapture amount shall be included in the gross income of the
corporation for such last taxable year (and appropriate adjustment to the
basis of inventory shall be made to take into account the amount included in
gross income under this paragraph).
Id.
If a C corporation that makes an S election uses the last in, first out (LIFO) ac-
counting method for its inventory, it must change to a first in, first out (FIFO) ac-
counting method. This change in accounting methods may increase the inventory's
balance sheet value. The S corporation is required to pay tax on this increase in
"book" value. HOOD & MYLAN, supra note 133, § 24:25.
136. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
137. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1993). See supra note 123 for text.
138. The Tax Court opinion in Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1990),
concedes that the return of an S corporation that owes tax at the corporate level is
a return for purposes of section 6501(a). Id. at 868. This means that for an S corpo-
ration that owes tax at the corporate level, the corporate return will be the return
from which the statute of limitations is measured. See also Green v. Commissioner,
963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992); Fehhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir.
1992).
139. I.R.C. § 6037(a). Section 6037 also applies to S corporations that are subject to
which states:
Every S corporation shall make a return for each taxable year, stating specifi-
cally the items of its gross income and the deductions allowable by subtitle A, the
names and addresses of all persons owning stock in the corporation at any time
during the taxable year, the number of shares of stock owned by each sharehold-
er at all times during the taxable year, the amount of money and other property
distributed by the corporation during the taxable year to each shareholder, the
date of each such distribution, each shareholder's pro rata share of each item of
the corporation for the taxable year, and such other information, for the purpose
of carrying out the provisions of subchapter S of chapter 1, as the Secretary may
by forms and regulations subscribe. Any return filed pursuant to this section shall,
for purposes of chapter 66 (relating to limitations), be treated as a return filed by
the corporation under section 6012.40
The second sentence of section 6037(a) clearly states that any return
filed pursuant to that section shall be treated as a return filed by the
corporation under section 6012. As noted earlier,"' any corporation, in-
cluding an S corporation, that files a return pursuant to section 6012 has
filed a return for purposes of section 6501(a), and therefore, the filing of
that return starts the statute of limitations period.
It is instructive to compare the language of code section 6037(a),
which requires an S corporation to file a tax return, with section 6031,
which requires a partnership to file a return, because S corporation re-
turns are often compared to partnership returns.' The first sentence of
both sections requires the business organization to file a return stating
the items of income, deductions, and credits. As many courts have noted,
however, the second sentence of section 6037(a) distinguishes the S
corporation return from the partnership return.' The second sentence
taxation and are therefore required to file returns under § 6012, because § 6037 is
applicable to "[elvery S corporation." Id. However, S corporations that owe tax at the
corporate level are required to file a corporate tax return pursuant to § 6012, thus
making the additional requirements of § 6037 beyond those required by § 6012 pre-
sumably supplemental. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
140. I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993).
141. See supra notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
142. I.R.C. § 6031(a) (1993). Section 6031(a) states:
Every partnership (as defined in section 761(a)) shall make a return for
each taxable year, stating specifically the items of its gross income and the
deductions allowable by subtitle A, and such other information for the pur-
pose of carrying out the provisions of subtitle A as the Secretary may by
forms and regulations prescribe, and shall include in the return the names
and addresses of the individuals who would be entitled to share in taxable
income if distributed and the amount of the distributive share of each indi-
vidual.
Id.
143. Courts, including the Tax Court, have recognized the difference in the statutory
language of §§ 6037 and 6031. See Siben v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991); Stahl v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 798 (1991).
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of section 6037(a) states that "[a]ny return filed pursuant to this section
shall, for purposes of chapter 66 (relating to limitations), be treated as a
return filed by the corporation under section 6012."' There is no com-
parable language in section 6031 which would be applicable to the return
filed by a partnership.' Thus, it follows that to give effect to the sec-
ond sentence of section 6037(a), an S corporation return should be treat-
ed differently than the mere "informational" return of a partnership.4 '
The language of section 6037(a) states that the S corporation return
should be treated as a return filed by a corporation under section 6012.
Since the return filed by an S corporation pursuant to section 6037(a)
is to be treated like a return filed by a corporation under section 6012,
the return of an S corporation that does not owe tax at the corporate
level must be considered a return for section 6501(a) purposes. If the S
corporation return is a return for section 6501(a) purposes, the S
corporation's return initiates the three year statute of limitations peri-
od. 47 Thus, the S corporation's return is not merely an "informational
return" like the return filed by a partnership, but, instead, it is a return
that initiates the running of the section 6501(a) statute of limitations pe-
riod.
Proponents of the position that section 6037 returns are not returns for
purposes of section 6501(a) often cite treasury regulation section 1.6037-
1(c), which states:
The return on Form 1120-S will be treated as a return filed by the corporation
under section 6012, relating to persons required to make returns of income, for
purposes of the provisions of chapter 66 of the Code, relating to limitations. Thus,
for example, the period of limitation on assessment and collection of any corpo-
rate tax found to be due upon a subsequent determination that the corporation
was not entitled to the benefits of subchapter S, chapter I of the Code, will run
from the date of filing the return under section 6037, or from the date prescribed
for filing such return, whichever is the later."
This regulation has been used to reinforce the position that an S corpora-
tion return filed pursuant to section 6037(a) will be treated as a return
that starts the section 6501(a) statute of limitations on assessment only if
the corporation's S election is later determined to be invalid."' The reg-
144. I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993). See supra text accompanying note 140 for text.
145. I.R.C. § 6031(a) (1993). See supra note 142 for text.
146. See Siben, 930 F.2d at 1037; Stahl, 96 T.C. at 801-02.
147. See Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1989).
148. Treas. Reg. 1.6037-1(c) (as amended in 1969).
149. See, e.g., Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863, 867 (1990), affd, 954 F.2d
653 (11th Cir. 1992).
ulation tracks the language of section 6037's legislative history, which
will be discussed more fully later.' Briefly, however, the regulation
does not provide for the restrictions that are claimed. It clearly states
that S corporation returns filed under section 6037(a) will be treated as
returns filed under 6012.' As.shown by the above discussion, corpo-
rate returns filed pursuant to section 6012 are returns for purposes of the
section 6501(a) statute of limitations.'2
Even if the regulation can be construed to support the position that
returns filed pursuant to section 6037(a) start the statute of limitations
only if it is later determined that the corporation's S election was invalid,
that interpretation directly conflicts with the language of section 6037(a),
which refers to "[a]ny return filed pursuant to this section."'" There is
no support in the statutory language of section 6037 for the limitation
claimed to be found in the regulation or a limitation of any other kind. A
regulation that conflicts with the language of Congress can not be en-
forced."
In Fehihaber, the Tax Court held that it was not bound to apply the
literal phrasing of a statute when it would lead to an "'absurd result."'' '
Though this standard has enough ambiguity to allow a court to exercise
result oriented jurisprudence, the interpretation of the interaction of
sections 6012, 6037, and 6501(a) as presented above could not be con-
sidered "absurd." The application of this standard is more logical given
the administrative difficulties and statutory inconsistencies that result
from treating some S corporation returns as returns for section 6501(a)
purposes and not others. Moreover, the interpretation presented above
looks even more reasonable when viewed with other Internal Revenue
Code provisions related to the taxation of S corporations.
Section 1371(a)(1) states a general rule that is relevant to the dispute
currently under discussion: "Except as otherwise provided in this title,
and except to the extent inconsistent with this subchapter, subchapter C
shall apply to an S corporation and its shareholders. " " This section
raises a presumption that the rules that apply to C corporations shall
also apply to S corporations. While it might be argued that this presump-
tion is limited to the rules in Subchapter C, the language "[e]xcept as
150. See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text.
151. Treas. Reg. 1.6037-1(c) (as amended in 1969). See supra text accompanying
note 148.
152. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
153. See I.R.C. ,§ 6037(a) (1993). See supra text accompanying note 140.
154. MERTENS, supra note 99, § 1.11.
155. Fehlhaber, 94 T.C. 863, 866 (1990) (quoting Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S.
563, 571 (1965)).
156. I.R.C. § 1371(a) (1993).
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otherwise provided by this title,"'57 contemplates the presumption cov-
ering all of title 26 of the United States Code, which would encompass
the whole Internal Revenue Code.
If S corporations are to be treated like C corporations (except where
otherwise provided or otherwise inconsistent), it follows that returns
filed by S corporations should be treated like returns filed by C corpora-
tions. Since the return filed by a C corporation is a return that triggers
limitations period, the S corporation return should also be treated as a
return that triggers the running of the section 6501(a) limitations period.
If the S corporation return is treated as a return that initiates the running
of the section 6501(a) limitations period, the Service is barred from mak-
ing assessments attributable to S corporation items reported on a
shareholder's individual return after the statute of limitations period for
the S corporation's return has expired.
There are some who might argue that section 6037 is a provision that
overturns the presumption or inference that S corporations are to be
treated as C corporations. Congress, however, is very explicit about cre-
ating an exception to the general inference of section 1371(a)(1). For
example, section 1372(a)(1) states: "For purposes of applying the provi-
sions of this subtitle which relate to employee fringe benefits the S cor-
poration shall be treated as a partnership .. . ."' The language of sec-
tion 6037(a) does not contain the specific language of an exception, such
as the one that appears in section 1372(a)(1). Instead, section 6037(a)
affirms the inference that S corporations are to be treated as C corpora-
tions when it states that any return filed under this section shall be treat-
ed as a return filed by a corporation pursuant to section 6012. To read
section 6037 as making the S corporation's return a mere "informational
return," similar to the return filed by a partnership, defies both the lan-
guage of section 6037(a) and the inference raised by code section
1371(a).
157. Id.
158. I.R.C. § 1372(a) (1993). Section 1372(a) states: "For purposes of applying the
provisions of this subtitle which relate to employee fringe benefits--(1) the S-corpora-
tion shall be treated as a partnership, and (2) any 2-percent shareholder of the S
corporation shall be treated as a partner of such partnership." Id.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Overview
As noted above, if a court concludes that the statutory language is am-
biguous, the court should examine the intent of Congress as evidenced
by the legislative history.'" Legislative intent, however, should be exam-
ined only if the meaning of a law is ambiguous.'" If the statu-tory lan-
guage is unambiguous, it should be followed.'"' The previous discussion
has shown that a proper analysis of the relevant code sections does not
require a court to examine the legislative history because the language of
the statute is clear.'" Although such an examination is not required, a
look at the legislative history provides support for the position that sec-
tion 6037 returns should be treated as returns for section 6501(a) purpos-
es.
84
The S corporation was created by Congress to make the choice of enti-
ty for a business enterprise tax neutral." Before the S corporation pro-
visions were enacted, the choice of entity for a business was either a
sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation. If there were two or
more people working as co-managers in the business enterprise, the
choice of entity was quickly pared to that of a partnership or a corpora-
tion."' The individual/owners obtained the advantages of limited liabil-
ity under state law only if the business was operated as a corporation.
However, they also incurred the disadvantage of two levels of taxation:
one at the corporate level on corporate income and a second tax paid by
the shareholder when the corporate earnings were distributed as divi-
dends."' If the business chose to become a partnership, it avoided the
two levels of taxation but did not get the advantage of limited liability
under state law.
With some sense that the choice of entity should not be driven so
strongly by tax considerations, Congress created a new kind of entity,
the S corporation.'67 The S corporation is a business that is incorporat-
ed under the laws of a state, thereby gaining the advantage of limited
liability, but is taxed as a pass-through entity, 'M A pass-through entity is
159. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 99-'104 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 122-58 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 164-84 and accompanying text.
164. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
165. See id.
166. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
167. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
168. Id.
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not taxed at the entity level.'O Rather, the income, deductions and cred-
its of the corporation are "passed through" to the shareholder and com-
puted as part of his individual tax liability.7 ' This arrangement avoids
the disadvantage of double taxation that occurs when a business oper-
ates as a C corporation.
B. The Legislative History of Section 6037
At the time the legislation creating the S corporation was enacted, the
S corporation did not pay tax at the entity level.' There was, therefore,
little apparent need for it to file a tax return. However, when Congress
enacted the S corporation provisions, it also enacted section 6037(a),
which requires the S corporation to file a tax return.'72 The following
passage from the Senate Report describes the legislation and the purpose
for requiring an S corporation to file a return:
Notwithstanding the fact that an electing small-business corporation is not
subject to the tax imposed by chapter 1 of the 1954 Code, such corporation must
make a return for each taxable year in accordance with new section 6037 as add-
ed by subsection (c) of section 68 of the bill. Such return will be considered as a
return filed under section 6012 for purposes of the provisions of chapter 66, relat-
ing to limitations. Thus, for example, the period of limitation on assessment and
collection of any corporate tax found to be due upon a subsequent determination
that the corporation was not entitled to the benefits of subchapter S, will run
from the date of filing of the return required under the new section 6037."'
Proponents of the position that S corporation returns do not trigger the
running of the limitations period cite this paragraph of legislative histo-
ry. 4 They interpret this paragraph as stating that the S corporation re-
turn initiates the running of the statute of limitations only if the S elec-
tion is later deemed invalid. 7 '
This interpretation of the legislative history does not adequately ex-
plain the use of the language "Thus, for example" that starts the last
169. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
170. I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1993). See supra note 33 for text.
171. With the enactment of Pub. L. No. 89-398, 80 Stat. 11 (1966), S corporations
were first required to pay tax at the corporate level.
172. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
173. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.kN. 4791, 5014.
174. See, e.g., Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1990), affd, 954 F.2d 653
(11th Cir. 1992).
175. Id. at 866.
sentence of the paragraph. One example is not indicative of an exhaus-
tive list of all the situations meant to be covered by the statute. Why,
then, would Congress use the language "Thus, for example" in the legis-
lative history of section 6037? What other examples did Congress have in
mind?
The scope of section 6037 at the time of its enactment was very limit-
ed. It required S corporations to file returns. The only business entities
that would file S corporation returns were corporations that validly made
an S election or C corporations that incorrectly filed an S corporation
return pursuant to an S election that was later determined to be invalid.
Thus, the only other situation Congress could have contemplated, other
than the situation included in the legislative history of section 6037, is
that of an S corporation that files an S corporation return pursuant to a
valid election. By using the language "Thus, for example," the legislative
history includes, by implication, the situation of an S corporation that
files an S corporation return pursuant to a valid election. Therefore, the
legislative history confirms that S corporation returns are returns that
start the statute of limitations running.
If Congress intended the S corporation return to be considered a cor-
porate return for statute of limitations purposes only in the event of an
invalid subchapter S election, it could have expressed that intention
clearly in the statute itself. Instead, the statutory language enacted by
Congress uses the broad language, "[a]ny return filed under this section
shall be treated as a return filed under 6012 for purposes of Article 66
(relating to limitations)."7 ' The legislative history plainly states that an
S corporation return "will be considered as a return filed under section
6012 for purposes of the provision of Chapter 66, relating to limita-
tions."77 The "example" given in the legislative history states that the
period of limitations on assessment "will run from the date of filing of
the return required under the new section 6037.""' Considering the lan-
guage of the statute and the legislative history, a better reading of sec-
tion 6037 and its legislative history would be: all returns filed under sec-
tion 6037 should be considered as filed under 6012 for limitations pur-
poses. One example of where the treatment of the return filed pursuant
to section 6037 might become significant is when a corporation's sub-
chapter S election is later deemed invalid.
It is possible that the language "Thus, for example" was used in the
legislative history for expediency. The passage of voluminous amounts of
legislation could lead to a hasty and unartful drafting of the legislative
176. I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993). See supra text accompanying note 140 for text.
177. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.KN. 4791, 5014.
178. Id.
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history. When drafting the legislative history of section 6037, Congress
may not have contemplated an alternative example, but did not wish. to
exclude situations they had failed to anticipate. This interpretation, how-
ever, is highly speculative and should not be relied upon in well reasoned
analysis.
It might be somewhat persuasive that section 6037 is found in the
section titled "Information returns," but section 7806(b) says that section
titles should be ignored." It could be argued that Congress enacted the
section 6037 return requirement for S corporations as the equivalent of
the section 6031 return requirement for partnerships. This would totally
ignore the second sentence of section 6037(a) which has no analogue in
the partnership section, section 6031.1' Even the Tax Court has recent-
ly taken notice of the difference between sections 6031 and 6037.8'
C. The Legislative History of the Unified Assessment Provisions
Another section of legislative history that indirectly discusses section
6037 is the Senate Report on the unified assessment provisions.' At
the time the unified assessment provisions were enacted, Congress ob-
served, "luinder present law, . . .. [sitatutes of limitations apply at the
individual level, based on the returns filed by the individual."" While it
seems that this statement strongly supports the position that S corpo-
ration returns filed pursuant to section 6037 (the then-current law re-
179. I.R.C. § 7806(b) (1993). Section 7806(b) states:
No inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall
be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular
section or provision or portion of this title, nor shall any table of contents,
table of cross references, or similar outline, analysis, or descriptive matter
relating to the contents of this title be given any legal effect. The preceding
sentence also applies to the sidenotes and ancillary tables contained in the
various prints of this Act before its enactment into law.
Id.
180. See id. § 6037(a). See supra text accompanying note 140 for text. Compare
I.R.C. § 6031(a). See supra note 142 for text. See also Siben v. Commissioner, 930
F.2d 1034, 1037 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991) (denoting the fact
that the second sentence of § 6037 has no analog in § 6031 and thus the statutes
should be applied differently); Stahl v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 798 (1991).
181. See Stahl, 96 T.C. 798 (citing Siben v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir.
1989)).
182. S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3253, 3275.
183. Id.
ferred to in the passage) are not returns for purposes of section 6501(a),
it would be ill-advised to put great weight on the interpretation Congress
made in 1982."u
The purpose of the legislative history for the unified assessment provi-
sions is to provide a backdrop for the enactment of code sections
6241-6245, which set out the unified assessment procedures for the deter-
mination of S corporation tax liability at the corporate level. The para-
graph of legislative history cited is not the result of a detailed analysis by
Congress on the current state of the law. The language does not address
the major sections at issue, but instead cuts a broad swath through the
law for purposes of comparison. Additionally, this language is of limited
value since it does not express the intent of Congress regarding the origi-
nal enactment of section 6037. The expression of congressional intent for
the original enactment of a code section should be more persuasive than
a summary treatment of the law in a congressional enactment of differ-
ent code sections twenty-four years later.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OPINIONS
A. The Return Requirement of Sections 6012 and 6037
1. S Corporations That Owe Tax
The Eleventh, Fifth, and Second Circuits affirmed the Tax Court's con-
clusion that the S corporation return starts the statute of limitations peri-
od running only when the S corporation is liable for tax at the corporate
level.'" The courts' conclusions are derived from an examination of the
statutory language of section 6037(a). 87 The circuit courts of appeal and
the Tax Court interpret the second sentence of section 6037(a), which
states that returns filed pursuant to section 6037 are to be treated as re-
turns filed under section 6012, as affecting only those S corporations that
become liable for tax at the corporate level."
The Supreme Court's position concerning the statute of limitations pe-
riod, for S corporations that owe tax at the corporate level is unclear."
184. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927, 931-32 n.10 (1993).
185. For a general discussion, see supra notes 122-58 and accompanying text.
186. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.,
1251 (1993); Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992), affg 94 T.C.
863 (1990); Bufferd v. Commissioner, 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992), affg 61 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2410 (1991).
187. Green, 963 F.2d at 790; Fehlhaber, 954 F.2d at 656; Bufferd, 952 F.2d at 677.
188. Green, 963 F.2d at 790; Fehliaber, 954 F.2d at 656; Bufferd, 952 F.2d at 677.
189. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993), affg 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1992).
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In the recent Bufferd opinion, the Supreme Court wrote, "[T]he errors on
the corporate return did not and could not affect the tax liability of the
corporation, and hence the Commissioner could only assess a deficiency
against the stockholder/taxpayer whose return claimed the benefit of the
errors.""® This sentence may be interpreted narrowly or broadly.
The narrow interpretation focuses on the language "the errors on the
corporate return did not and could not affect the tax liability of the cor-
poration .. .. ." If the S corporation owed tax at the corporate level,
then this language leaves open the possibility that when assessments
could be made against the S corporation, the statute of limitations begins
to run with the corporate return. Taxpayers, who are shareholders in an
S corporation, involved in future cases in which the S corporation owed
tax could use this language to distinguish and, thereby limit, the applica-
tion of the Supreme Court opinion in Bufferd.
The broad interpretation of the above quoted language"9 is that an
assessment can only be made against the taxpayer who is to pay the tax.
Therefore, even if the S corporation owes tax at the corporate level, only
those adjustments to the S corporation return that affect the
corporation's tax liability are barred by the expiration of the limitations
period for the corporate return. If the adjustment does not affect the tax
liability of the corporation, only the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions for the shareholder's return reporting the S corporation flow-
through tax items would bar the assessment.
The broad interpretation begs the question of whether the statute of
limitations bars an adjustment to an entity's return if that adjustment
does not affect the tax liability of that entity. If the Supreme Court
adopts the broad initerpretation, it would provide the government with
the only analysis which unqualifiedly supports the government's position
in the cases discussed in this article. Under the broad interpretation, the
statute of limitations for S corporations that owe tax begins to run with
the filing of the S corporation return only for the tax items that affect
the S corporation's tax liability. For the items that flow-through to the
shareholder's return, the shareholder's return would be the return which
initiates the statute of limitations regardless of whether the S corporation
is liable for tax.
What remains to be answered after the Supreme Court opinion in
190. Id. at 930.
191. Id.
192. See supra text accompanying note 190.
Bufferd is whether the law should be applied to reflect the broad inter-
pretation or the narrow interpretation of the Supreme Court's language.
The implications of applying the broad interpretation of the Bufferd lan-
guage are discussed more thoroughly later in this article.'93 However,
the case for the broad interpretation is weakened by the fact that it is di-
rectly counter to the conclusions of the Tax Court and at least four cir-
cuit courts of appeal regarding S corporations that owe tax at the corpo-
rate level.' Considering the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's language
in Bufferd, the better interpretation is the one that is most consistent
with the clearly articulated position of the other courts, especially in
light of the fact that the specific holding of the Supreme Court in Bufferd
concerned only the application of the statute of limitations to the
S corporation's shareholders who did not owe tax at the corporate lev-
el.19
5
Further support for the narrow interpretation is found in other passag-
es of the Supreme Court opinion. The Supreme Court cites the Tax Court
opinion of Lardas v. CommissionerW ' in a footnote.'97 The citation
from Lardas cites the Tax Court opinion in Fehlhaber."' In Fehlhaber,
the Tax Court concedes that if the S corporation owed income tax at the
corporate level, the statute of limitations would be triggered by the filing
of the S corporation's return."' In addition, the Supreme Court suggests
that when the S corporation is subject to the capital gains tax, the stat-
ute of limitations for assessing that tax begins with the filing of the
corporation's return.' While some of the language of Bufferd provides
support for possible future Supreme Court decisions adopting the broad
interpretation, currently the Supreme Court's opinion in Bufferd should
be read as adopting the narrow interpretation of the language cited
above."' The narrow interpretation of the language produces consisten-
cy among the Court's opinion, the opinion of the Tax Court, and the
opinion of four of the circuit courts of appeal.
The analysis used by the circuit courts of appeal and the Tax Court for
193. See infra notes 306-31 and accompanying text.
194. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1251 (1993); Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir.. 1992), affg 94 T.C.
863 (1990); Fendell v. Commissioner, 906 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1990); Kelley v. Commis-
sioner, 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989).
195. See Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993), affg 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1992).
196. 99 T.C. 490 (1992)).
197. Buffered, 113 S. Ct. at 932-33 n.11.
198. Lardas, 99 T.C. 490 (citing Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863, 868 (1990),
affd, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992)).
199. See Fehlhaber, 94 T.C. at 868.
200. Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 931-32 n.10.
201. See supra text accompanying note 190.
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S corporations that owe tax, however, has two significant weaknesses.
The first weakness is present in the Supreme Court's analysis of S corpo-
rations that are subject to the capital gains tax.2 2 As discussed earlier,
an S corporation that is liable for tax at the corporate level would be a
corporation that owes tax under the provisions of subtitle A.' As such,
section 6012(a)(2) requires the S corporation to file a return.' The sug-
gestion that the second sentence of section 6037(a) converts S corpora-
tion returns to section 6012 returns in the event that the S corporation
owes tax at the corporate level makes the second sentence of section
6037(a) surplus. A return filed by an S corporation that owes tax meets
the definition of a section 6012 return without the language contained in
the second sentence of section 6037(a).2" No purpose would be served
by including language in a statute that has the same effect as language in
a pre-existing statute.
Secondly, the circuit and Tax Courts' reasoning is undermined by the
fact that S corporations were not liable for any corporate level tax at the
time section 6037 was enacted.' Since S corporations did not pay a
corporate level tax when section 6037 was enacted, interpreting the sec-
ond sentence of section 6037(a) as applying only when an S corporation
owes tax at the corporate level ignores the congressional intent of this
code section. 7 The interpretation of section 6037(a) that these courts
adopt, as it pertains to S corporations that owe tax at the corporate
level, fails to give effect either to the statutory language of section
6037(a) or the congressional intent behind the statutes' enactment.
2. S Corporations That Do Not Owe Tax at the Corporation Level
a. Overview
The courts holdings that the statute of limitations for the S corporation
tax items begins with the filing of the shareholder's return reframe the
main argument. The opinions discuss whether the S corporation return
can be a "return" for purposes of section 6501(a).' The courts that
202. See Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 931-32 n.10.
203. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
204. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(2) (1993). See supra text accompanying note 129 for text.
205. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
206. S corporations were first required to pay tax at the corporate level with the
enactment of Pub. L. No. 89-398, 80 Stat. 111 (1966).
207. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
208. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927, 930 (1993), affg 952 F.2d 675, 677
have ruled against the taxpayer focus on the fact that the S corporation's
return is a mere "informational return," which does not result in tax lia-
bility to the S corporation. M
In finding that the S corporation return does not start the section
6501(a) limitation period, these courts conclude that the S corporation
return does not meet the traditional common law definition of a "return"
for section 6501(a) purposes."' Pursuant to that body of case law, there
is a general consensus that the return must contain the information nec-
essary to calculate the taxpayer's tax liability before it will be considered
a "return" within the meaning of section 6501(a).2" Because the S cor-
poration return lacks vital information necessary for calculating the
shareholder's resulting tax liability, these courts reason that the S corpo-
ration return does not trigger the section 6501(a) statute of limitation for
assessments against the shareholder."2 The Eleventh Circuit bolstered
this analysis by explaining the purpose of the Subchapter S provi-
sions,2"3 stating that the purpose of Subchapter S was to have a corpo-
ration taxed like a partnership. 24 The court then concluded that it is in-
consistent with that intention to treat the S corporation return as a re-
turn for section 6501(a) purposes. 5
The reasoning used by these courts is unsound for several reasons.
First, the thrust of the taxpayer's argument is not that the S corporation
return meets the common law requirements for a section 6501(a) return.
Rather, the argument centers on the interpretation of the language con-
tained in section 6037(a) and whether that language requires a return
that might not ordinarily be considered a return for purposes of section
6501(a) to be treated as such."" Therefore, dispositive analysis of the
meaning of section 6037(a) should not consider whether the S corpora-
tion return meets the requirements found in case law defining a return
for section 6501(a) purposes.
Secondly, the concept that an S corporation is taxed like a partnership
rather than a C corporation should not control the analysis. Undeniably,
(2d Cir. 1992); Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1251 (1993); Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653, 655 (11th Cir. 1992),
affg 94 T.C. 863, 868 (1990). Compare Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756, 759
(9th Cir. 1989).
209. Green, 963 F.2d at 788 (citing Fehlhaber, 954 F.2d at 656); see also Bufferd,
113 S. Ct. at 930.
210. Id.; Green, 963 F.2d at 788; Fehlhaber, 954 F.2d at 655.
211. MERTENS, supra note 99, § 57.09.
212. Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 930; Green, 963 F.2d at 788; Fehlhaber, 954 F.2d at 655.
213. Fehlhaber, 954 F.2d at 655.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra 139-81 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 21: 31, 1993] S Corporations
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
both S corporations and partnerships are "pass-through entities," and as
such share many characteristics. S corporations, however, have never
been taxed under the partnership provisions of subchapter K of the
Code.2"7 Differences between the taxation of S corporations and
partnerships have existed from the inception of the S corporation to the
present Code."1 8 Further, the legislative history relating to the subchap-
ter S provisions does not describe the S corporation as a corporation
that is taxed in the same manner as a partnership."9 Every reference to
the new entity created by that public law refers to an "electing small
business." 0
The language of section 1371(a) is consistent with the concept that the
S corporation is not strictly a "corporation taxed like a partnership."
Code section 1371(a) states that the rules for C corporations apply to S
corporations unless the application would be inconsistent with the rules
of Subchapter S.22 The language of section 6037(a) merely repeats the
presumption that the S corporation should be viewed as a C corporation
and applies this principle to the act of filing a return. Thus, the Code
raises a presumption that the S corporation return is to be treated like
the return of a C corporation. The paradigm that the courts use for treat-
ing S corporation returns similar to "informational returns" filed by part-
nerships fails to address these arguments. It would be a mistake to base
an interpretation of the rules relating to S corporation returns on a
flawed analogy to code sections or taxation theory that applies to part-
nerships, rather than the statutory language and the intention of Con-
gress relating to S corporations.
b. Interpreting the statutes
In Kelley v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by
looking at the language of section 6037(a).' The Ninth Circuit noted
217. See MERTENS, supra note 99, §§ 41B.02 & 41B.03.
218. Id.
219. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
220. Id.
221. I.R.C. § 1371(a) (1993). See supra text accompanying note 156. The Supreme
Court clearly disregards the language of this section when it notes in Bufferd that
the taxpayer's premise of comparing the statute of limitations of C corporations to S
corporations was flawed because "the taxation of C corporations and their stock-
holders is so markedly different from that of S corporations." Bufferd v. Commis-
sioner, 113 S. Ct. 927, 932 n.11 (1993), af'g 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992).
222. 877 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1989).
that the plain language of section 6037(a) states that any return filed un-
der section 6037 should, for purposes of the section 6501(a) statute of
limitations, be treated as a return filed by a C corporation.' Therefore,
the court concluded that the Service may not make assessments relating
to the S corporation return or any S corporation tax item reported on
the shareholder's return after the expiration of the statute of limitations
for the S corporation return.22 ' The Ninth Circuit analyzed how this in-
terpretation is both fair and consistent with purposes of the statute of
limitations provision."
In Bufferd, the Supreme Court stated that the language "any return"
does not demonstrate that the shareholder's return is brought within the
compass of section 6037(a) simply because the tax items are passed
through from the corporation's return and reported on the shareholder's
return."6 The Supreme Court further suggested that section 6037(a)'s
focus on the return of the S corporation supports the opposite conclu-
sion." The snag in the Supreme Court's analysis, as the taxpayer in
Bufferd argued, is that the interpretation the Supreme Court gives sec-
tion 6037 effectively eliminates the second sentence of section 6037(a)
from the Code." At the time section 6037(a) was enacted, S corpora-
tions did not pay tax at the corporate level.22 There would have been
no purpose for enacting a statute of limitations for assessment on an
entity that was never subject to tax unless it was intended to prevent an
assessment against the shareholders of that entity on the corporate tax
items passed through and reported. on the shareholders' returns.'
The Supreme Court suggested that its interpretation preserves the vi-
tality of section 6037(a) in two ways. First, the Supreme Court stated
that, prior to the time S corporations were subject to any corporate level
tax, the statute of limitations supplied by section 6037 provided a limited
period for the Service to invalidate the S election.' The taxpayer ar-
gued against the Supreme Court's interpretation, noting that if an S elec-
tion is invalidated, the S corporation return automatically becomes sub-
ject to the rules of subchapter C. 2 The Supreme Court countered by
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927, 931 (1993), affg 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1992).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. S corporations were first required to pay tax at the corporate level with the
enactment of Pub. L. No. 89-398, 80 Stat. 111 (1966).
230. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
231. Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 931.
232. Id.
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stating that "this proposition is hardly self evident."'
Although the Supreme Court argued that it is not self evident that a
corporation making an invalid S election becomes subject to the rules of
subchapter C, this is not a difficult position to defend. S corporations are
C corporations that have elected S status.' If a corporation's S election
is invalidated, it continues to maintain its corporate status, and thus, be-
comes subject to the rules that normally apply to corporations-the rules
of subchapter C.
Section 6012(a)(2) requires that corporations subject to tax under sub-
title A file a return.' However, the C corporation, with a now invalid S
election, has filed a tax return pursuant to section 6037(a) that reports
the corporation's "gross income and deductions."' The reporting of
this data, according to the cases cited by the Supreme Court in Bufferd,
is the minimum information necessary to constitute a "return" for pur-
poses of section 6501(a) and start the statute of limitations running.n
Therefore, if the Service invalidates the S election within the three year
limitations period, it may determine the tax liability of the C corporation
from the return mistakenly filed by the corporation pursuant to section
6037(a). If the Service does not invalidate the S election within the three
year limitations period, the Service is still barred from making an assess-
ment of tax against the corporation by the expiration of the statute of
limitations period for the corporate return filed pursuant to an invalid S
election, even without section 6037(a) of the Code.' Thus, this justifi-
cation used by the Supreme Court to demonstrate how its interpretation
maintains the vitality of section 6037 is frail.
The Supreme Court's second justification supporting the position that
its interpretation retains some vitality for section 6037(a) is the case of
an S corporation that owes a corporate level tax.' In a footnote, the
Supreme Court noted that without section 6037(a), the Service could ar-
233. Id.
234. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1) (1993). Section 1361(a)(1) states: "For purposes of this title,
the term 'S corporation' means, with respect to any taxable year, a small business
corporation for which an election under section 1362(a) is in effect for such year."
Id.
235. Id. § 6012(a)(2). See supra text accompanying note 129 for text.
236. See I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993). See supra text accompanying note 140 for text.
237. Bqfferd, 113 S. Ct. at 930 (citing Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commission-
er, 353 U.S. 180, 188 (1957) (citing Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219
(1944))).
238. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1993). See supra note 123 for text.
239. Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 931-32 n.10.
gue that the statute of limitations for an S corporation subject to the cap-
ital gains tax begins to run from the time of filing of the shareholder's re-
turn." However, an S corporation subject to the capital gains tax
would be a corporation subject to taxation under Subtitle A and there-
fore required to file a tax return under section 6012(a)(2)." Thus, even
without section 6037(a), the Service could not successfully argue that the
statute of limitations on an S corporation that owed corporate income
tax was only triggered upon the filing of the shareholder's return.u"
When discussing S corporations that do not owe corporate income tax,
neither the Tax Court, the Eleventh, nor the Second Circuit have ana-
lyzed the plain meaning of the statutory language of section 6037(a) in
any depth.2" The Tax Court has suggested that the taxpayer's interpre-
tation of the statutory language, which relies on the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in Kelley, is "absurd."2" The Eleventh Circuit has suggested that
taxpayer's analysis is against "common sense."" The analysis of the
plain language of section 6037(a) is not more extensive than these con-
clusions."' Holders of these opinions explain the existence of the sec-,
ond sentence of section 6037(a) by reasoning that the sentence applies
only to S corporations that owe tax at the corporate level. 7 As suggest-
ed above, the rationale for such a position is suspect." S corporations
that owe tax are required to file returns by section 6012(a)(2) regardless
of the section 6037(a) return requirement.249
The Fifth Circuit has focused more on the statutory language of sec-
tion 6037(a)." When interpreting the second sentence of section
6037(a), which states that an S corporation return filed pursuant to sec-
tion 6037 should, for purposes of limitations, be treated as a return filed
under section 6012, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the return filed by the
S corporation must be examined in light of the language of section
6012." Section 6012(a)(2) states that a corporation subject to taxation
240. Id.
241. See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(2) (1993). See text accompanying note 129 for text.
.242. See supra notes 139-58 and accompanying text.
243. See Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1990), affd, 954 F.2d 653 (11th
Cir. 1992); Bufferd v. Commissioner, 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992).
244. See Fehlhaber, 94 T.C. at 866.
245. Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992).
246. See Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863 (1990), affd, 954 F.2d 653 (11th
Cir. 1992); Bufferd v. Commissioner, 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992).
247. Fehlhaber, 94 T.C. at 868; Feldhaber, 954 F.2d at 656; Bufferd, 952 F.2d at 677-
78.
248. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
250. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783, 790 (5th Cir. 1992).
251. Id.
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under subtitle A must file a return. 2 The Fifth Circuit noted that an S
corporation that does not owe tax at the corporate level is not required
to file a section 6012 return, and therefore, neither section 6012 nor the
second line of section 6037(a) are applicable to an S corporation that
does not owe corporate income tax.2
The implication of the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of section 6037 is
that the second sentence of that section applies only to S corporations
that owe tax at the corporate level.' As discussed above, the rationale
for such a result is flawed.' Applying the better interpretation of the
interaction between section 6037 and section 6012 developed in this arti-
cle' shows how the Fifth Circuit's analysis of section 6037(a) for S
corporations that do not owe corporate income tax fails to give effect to
the language Congress placed into the Code. Giving effect to the lan-
guage contained in the second sentence of section 6037(a) contradicts
the analysis used by the Fifth Circuit to resolve this dispute.
c. Interpreting the legislative history
Only in response to the Tax Court did the Ninth Circuit examine the
legislative history of section 6037."7 Upon this examination, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the Tax Court's opinion ignores the language "[flor
example" present in the legislative history.' The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that section 6037 and its accompanying legislative history should be in-
terpreted such that a return filed by an S corporation under section
6037(a) should be treated as a return filed by a corporation under sec-
tion 6012 for purposes of the section 6501(a) limitations period.' An
example where treating the S corporation return as a return filed by a C
corporation would be relevant is the case of an invalid election.' Such
an interpretation bars the Service from making adjustments attributable
to the S corporation tax items, reported on the S corporation's return or
on the returns of its shareholders, after the limitations period has ex-
252. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(2) (1993). See supra text accompanying note 129 for text.
253. Green, 963 F.2d at 790.
254. Id.
255. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 122-84 and accompanying text.
257. Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1989).
258. Id. at 759.
259. See id. at 756.
260. Id.
pired for the S corporation return."'
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit and the Tax Court rely
expressly on the legislative history of section 6037 to support their posi-
tions.262 The Supreme Court stated that its conclusion was based on the
relevant statutory language, and, further, that the use of the legislative
history was unnecessary to reach its holding.6 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, then proceeded to discuss the legislative history in a footnote.2"
The language upon which the Tax Court focused to validate its,claim
was: "Thus, for example, the period of limitations on assessment and
collection of any. corporate tax found to be due upon a subsequent deter-
mination that the corporation was not entitled to the benefits of sub-
chapter S, will run from the date of filing of the return required under
the new section 6037. "'2 The Tax Court interpreted this passage to
mean that the S corporation return is the return that starts the running
of the section 6501(a) statute of limitations only when the S election is
later found invalid.' By focusing on the above italicized language, the
Tax Court ignored the language that begins the sentence, "Thus, for ex-
ample,...."267 One example is not indicative of the exhaustive list of
possible situations to which the legislation was meant to apply. The legis-
lative history simply does not say what the Tax Court claimed it says.
The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, in a nod to the Ninth
Circuit, recognized that one example is not inclusive of all the possibili-
ties meant to be covered by that paragraph of legislative history.2" The
Eleventh Circuit, however, failed to elaborate on any other reasons.2"
The Eleventh Circuit, instead, analyzed the legislative history of section
6037 by relying on Congress' interpretation of the then-present state of
the law when enacting the unified assessment provisions.27
The Supreme Court, in Bufferd, stated that the use of the legislative
history for the enactment of unified assessment provisions to interpret
section 6037 is inappropriate.27 ' The congressional intent behind section
261. Id.
262. Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863,. 866-67 (1990), qffd, 954 F.2d 653, 656
(11th Cir. 1992).
263. Buffered v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927, 931-32 n.10 (1993).
264. Id.
265. Fehdhaber, 94 T.C. at 867 (citing S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958))
(emphasis added).
266. Fehihaber, 94 T.C. at 868.
267. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4791, 5014.
268. Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 931-32 n.10; Fehlhaber, 954 F.2d at 656.
269. See Fehlhaber, 954 F.2d at 656.
270. Id. at 656-57.
271. Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 931-32 n.10.
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6037, as evidenced by the legislative history, must have some meaning
independent of the congressional enactment of unified assessment provi-.
sions. This is especially true considering that section 6037 was enacted a
full twenty-four years before the unified assessment provisions.
The other reason offered by the Supreme Court for the use of the lan-
guage, "Thus, for example,... ,"in the legislative history for the enact-
ment of section 6037, is that it allows section 6037 to apply to S corpora-
tions subject to a corporate income tax. 2 The Supreme Court sug-
gested that if the legislative history of section 6037 did not contain this
particular language, the Service could argue that the limitations period
for a corporate level capital gains tax begins only with the filing of the
shareholder's return.
2m3
As has been noted several times herein,274 an S corporation subject to
a corporate level tax is subject to taxation under subtitle A. A corpora-
tion subject to taxation under subtitle A is required by section 6012(a)(2)
to file a return. 5 A return filed pursuant to section 6012(a)(2) is a re-
turn for purposes of section 6501(a).2 7' Therefore, for S corporations
that owe a corporate tax, the Code prescribes a three year statute of lim-
itations regardless of the presence or absence of section 6037(a). 7 The
Supreme Court's analysis failed to adequately explain the language,
"Thus, for example, ... ," present in the legislative history of section
6037.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 6037 gives full effect to
the statutory language and the congressional intent as evidenced by the
legislative history. The alternate interpretations of the statutory language
and the legislative history of section 6037 offered by the Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit, and the Tax
Court, are neither as logical nor as consistent as the Ninth Circuit's inter-
pretation.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
275. See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(2) (1993). See supra text accompanying note 129 for text.
276. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
277. See supra section 132-38 and accompanying text.
3. Other Arguments
a. Precedents
i. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner
The Supreme Court and the Tax Court partially relied on the case of
Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner" for their holdings.'
That case involved an organization that had its tax exempt status re-
voked.'s The taxpayers argued that their filing of the Form 990 return
required by section 54(f)" of the 1943 Code constituted the filing of a
278. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
279. See Buffered v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. at 927, 930 (1993) (citing Automobile
Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957) (citing Commissioner v. Lane-
Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219 (1944))). See also Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863,
869 (1990), affd, 954 F.2d 653, 656 (11th Cir. 1992).
280. Automobile Club, 353 U.S. at 182.
281. I.R.C. § 54(f) (West 1943). Section 54(f) states:
Every organization, except as hereinafter provided, exempt from taxation
under section 101, shall file an annual return, which shall contain or be veri-
fied by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury,
stating specifically the items of gross income, receipts, and disbursements,
and such other information for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of
this chapter as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, may by
regulations prescribe, and shall keep such records, render under oath such
statements, make such other returns, and comply with such rules and regula-
tions, as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary may from
time to time prescribe. No such annual return need be filed under this sub-
section by any organization exempt from taxation under the provisions of
section 101-
(1) which is a religious organization exempt under section 101(6) or
(2) which is an education organization exempt under section 101(6), if
such organization normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and
normally has a regularly organized body of pupils or students in attendance
at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on; or
(3) which is a charitable organization, or an organization for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals, exempt under section 101(6), if
such organization is supported, in whole or in part, by funds contributed by
the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, or is primarily
supported by contributions of the general public; or
(4) which is an organization exempt under section 101(6), if such orga-
nization is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in connection with a reli-
gious organization described in paragraph (1); or
(5) which is an organization exempt solely under section 101(3); or
(6) which is an organization exempt under section 101(15), if such
organization is a corporation wholly owned by the United States or any agen-
cy or instrumentality thereof, or a wholly owned subsidiary of such a corpo-
ration.
Id.
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return for statute of limitations purposes. 2 Thus, the running of the
limitations period from the filing of the Form 990 return would have pre-
vented the Service from making assessments against the automobile club
for past years in which the tax exempt status of the organization was
later revoked." The Supreme Court rejected the taxpayers' argu-
ment.284 Both the Buffered Court and the Tax Court sought to
strengthen their position by comparing the Form 990 returns to an S cor-
poration return.as
The use of Automobile Club weakens the reasoning of the Supreme
Court and the Tax Court and strengthens the interpretation made by the
Ninth Circuit in several ways. To begin, Automobile Club is dated, and
has, in fact, been so since the day it was announced. Although the deci-
sion was announced in 1957, the Form 990 returns at issue were filed in
the mid 1940's.' By 1954, the Internal Revenue Code had been amend-
ed to provide that returns filed by a tax exempt organization in good
faith start the statute of limitations running even if that organization is
later determined to be a taxable organization."5 This amendment has
been retained as code section 6501(g)(2).' Any doubt as to the mean-
ing of this section was resolved when the Service issued Revenue Ruling
60-144, which states that Form 990 returns filed in good faith "will be
deemed the return of the organization for purposes of starting the run-
ning of the statute of limitations. " '
Even if Automobile Club had not been overruled, the language and
legislative history of the relevant code sections show the differences be-
tween the Form 990 returns at issue in Automobile Club and the S corpo-
282. Automobile Club, 353 U.S. at 181.
283. Id. at 187.
284. Id.
285. Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863, 869' (1990), affd, 954 F.2d 653 (11th
Cir. 1992).
286. Automobile Club, 353 U.S. at 181.
287. I.R.C. § 6501(g)(2) (West 1954). Section 6501(g)(2) provides:
If the taxpayer determines in good faith that it is an exempt organiza-
tion and files a return as such under section 6033, and if such taxpayer is
thereafter held to be a corporation for the taxable year for which the return
is filed, such return shall be deemed the return of the corporation for pur-
poses of this section.
Id.
288. I.R.C. § 6501(g)(2) (1993). For the text of this section, which is the same as
the version in the 1954 Code, see supra note 287.
289. Rev. Rul. 60-144, 1960-1 C.B. 638.
ration returns discussed in this article. Looking at section 54 (f) ° and
its current equivalent, section 6033," the language does not indicate
that a return filed pursuant to that section is to be treated as a return
filed under section 6012 for limitations purposes as the language in sec-
tion 6037(a) requires.' This difference in statutory language indicates
that each section should be interpreted differently.' The difference in
the legislative history of section 54(f) of the 1943 Code and the legislative
history of section 6037(a) also underscores the difference between the
tax exempt organization returns at issue in Automobile Club and the S
corporation returns at issue in the cases under discussion in this Article.
The legislative history of section 54(f) explicitly states that the return
filed by a tax exempt organization is an "informational return;" ' the leg-
islative history of section 6037 does not. 5 In fact, the legislative history
of section 6037 suggests the opposite.2"
Lastly, the citation to Automobile Club underscores how a return that
fails the common law definition of a "return" for section 6501(a) purpos-
es may be elevated to the status of a section 6501(a) return by another
section of the Code. In Automobile Club, the Supreme Court held that
the returns filed by the non-profit corporation did not start the statute of
limitations running.' Congress, however, overturned the specific hold-
ing of Automobile Club when it enacted a code section that stated that
the informational return of a non-profit corporation started the statute of
290. See supra note 280.
291. I.R.C. § 6033 (1993). Section 6033(a)(1) states in relevant part:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), every organization exempt from
taxation under section 501(a) shall file an annual return, stating specifically
the item of gross income, receipts, and disbursements, and such other infor-
mation for the purpose of carrying out the internal revenue laws as the Sec-
retary may by forms or regulations prescribe; except that, in the discretion of
the Secretary, any organization described in section 401(a) may be relieved
from stating in its return any information which is reported in returns filed
by the employer which established such organization.
Id.
292. I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993). See supra text accompanying note 140.
293. Cf Siben v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429
(1991); Stahl v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 798 (1991) (observing that I.R.C. § 6031(a)
(1993) and I.R.C. § 6037(a) (1993) contain different language and should be applied
differently).
294. See S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1943). "Under the house bill,
these exempt corporations are required to file returns of income for taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1942, in order to secure sufficient information to deter-
mine whether such corporations should be subject to taxation." Id.
295. See supra text accompanying note 173.
296. See supra notes 159-81 and accompanying text.
297. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
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limitations running if it was filed in good faith.' Section 6037(a) has
the same effect for S corporation returns as section 6501(g) has on the
returns filed by non-profit corporations. Section 6037(a), by its interac-
tion with section 6012, elevates a return that ordinarily would not be
treated as a "return" by the common law to the status of a section
6501(a) "return." 9
ii. Leonhart v. Commissioner
In addition to the legislative history and Automobile Club of Michigan
v. Commissioner," the Tax Court relied on the case of Leonhart v.
Commissioner."' In Leonhart, two S corporation shareholders claimed
that the Service was barred from adjusting their tax liability for items
relating to the S corporation on the basis that the three year statute of
limitations had run on their S corporation return.' The statute of limi-
tations had not run on the shareholder's individual tax liability.' The
Tax Court ruled that an S corporation return filed pursuant to section
6037 triggered the running of the statute of limitations only if the sub-
chapter S election was later shown to be invalid.' The Tax Court in
Leonhart cited the same passage of legislative history on which the
Fehlhaber Tax Court relied.-' Although the Leonhart case is precedent,
its reasoning is no more compelling today than when it was decided.
b. The assessment argument
A closer examination of Buffered reveals that the taxpayer argued that
C corporation returns could not be adjusted after the limitations period
had run.' The Court questioned this conclusion and noted that the tax-
payer cited no authority for it."97 Similar analysis was used by the Sec-
298. Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68 Stat. 730 (1954).'
299. See supra notes 122-58 and accompanying text.
300. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
301. 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 443 (1968); see also Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863,
867 (1990), qffd, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Leonhart v. Commissioner, 353
U.S. 180 (1957)).
302. Id. at 462.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 462-63.
306. Buffered v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927, 932-33 n.11 (1993).
307. Id.
ond Circuit in its Bufferd opinion." The Second Circuit suggested that
an adjustment to the tax return of an S corporation more than three
years after the filing of its return is not an "assessment" for purposes of
section 6501(a).' The Second Circuit stated: "Section 6501(a) does not
bar adjustments to an entity's return that do not result in a tax assess-
ment on that entity."31
Following the Second Circuit's "assessment" rationale, adjustments
relating to the tax items of the S corporation could still be made if the S
corporation's tax liability is not changed. Since an S corporation that
owes tax at the corporate level still "passes-through" the tax items relat-
ing to other income not taxed at the corporate level, an adjustment to
those tax items would not change the corporation's tax liability.
Therefore, the broad interpretation of the Supreme Court's language in
Bufferd is consistent with the "assessment" analysis of the Second Cir-
cuit. " ' If the broad interpretation is adopted, the government's position
in the cases discussed in this article is correct.
A narrow interpretation, however, is more consistent with the position
adopted by four circuit courts of appeal and the Tax Court.312 If the Su-
preme Court were to expressly adopt the narrow interpretation of the
language in the Bufferd opinion, and hold that no assessment could be
made to the return of a shareholder of an S corporation that owed cor-
porate level tax after the limitations period for assessment against the S
corporation had expired, the Second Circuit's "assessment" rationale
would be compromised.
In Bufferd, the Supreme Court appeared to be influenced by the
government's citation of authority that countered the taxpayer's claim
that a C corporation's return could not be adjusted after the statute of
limitations period."3 The government cited Commissioner v.
Munter."' Munter involved a dispute between the shareholders of a
corporation and the Service regarding whether a corporate distribution
was a dividend or a return of capital."5 The shareholders claimed that
the corporation lacked sufficient earnings and profits to distribute a divi-
308. Buffered v. Commissioner, 952 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1992).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 677.
311. See Bufferd v. Commissioner, 952 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1992).
312. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1251 (1993); Fehihaber v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992), affg 94 T.C.
863 (1990); Fendall v. Commissioner, 906 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1990); Kelley v. Commis-
sioner, 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989).
313. Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 932-33 n.ll (citing Commissioner v. Munter, 331 U.S. 210
(1947)).
314. 331 U.S. 210 (1947).
315. Id. at 211-12.
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dend.1 6 The government claimed that the distributing corporation,
which resulted from a merger that occurred in 1928, succeeded to the
earnings and profits of the predecessor corporations."7 Therefore, the
corporation had sufficient earnings and profits to make the distribution a
dividend."8 The Supreme Court was persuaded by the government's ob-
servation that the statute of limitations issue was not discussed in the
Munter opinion."9
While Bufferd's citation to Munter may have some merit, it is weak
support for the Supreme Court's broad conclusion that follows. Unlike
the S corporation items, earnings and profits are generally not reported
as part of a corporation's income tax return. Issues relating to the exis-
tence or absence of earnings and profits would not arise until a corpo-
rate distribution took place." The distribution at issue in Munter was
made in 1940."' The three year statute of limitations in effect at the
time' would not have run on a return filed on April 15, 1941 until April
15, 1944. The Tax Court issued its opinion in the Munter case on May 22,
1945. ' Therefore, it is very likely that the Service's assessment was
made in a timely manner. However, neither the Tax Court opinion,'
the circuit court opinion,"' nor the Supreme Court opinion"' in
Munter state when the Service's assessment was made. While it is possi-
316. I.R.C. § 301(a) (1993). Section 301(a) states the general rule for corporate dis-
tributions: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a distribution of proper-
ty ... made by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock. shall be
treated in the manner provided in subsection (c)." Id. I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (1993) fur-
ther provides that "the portion of the distribution which is a dividend (as defined in
I.R.C. § 316 (1993)) shall be included in gross income. The remaining portion of the
distribution is applied against and reduces the shareholder's adjusted basis in his/her
stock." I.R.C. § 301(c)(2) (1993). Any portion of the distribution in excess of the
shareholder's adjusted basis is treated as capital gain. I.R.C. § 301(c)(3) (1993).
I.R.C. § 316(a) (1993), which defines the portion of the distribution which is a
dividend, states: "For purposes of this subtitle, the term "dividend" means any distri-
bution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders-(1) out of its earnings
and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913 . " Id.
317. Munter, 331 U.S. at 215-16.
318. See supra note 316.
319. See Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927, 932-33 n.ll (1993).
320. See supra note 316.
321. Munter, 331 U.S. 210.
322. I.R.C. § 275(a) (1993).
323. Munter v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 108 (1945).
324. Id.
325. Munter v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1946).
326. Commissioner v. Munter, 331 U.S. 210 (1947).
ble that the statute of limitations defense was available to the
shareholders in Munter, it is more likely that it was not. The facts, as
stated in the three court opinions, do not provide the information neces-
sary to determine the availability of the statute of limitations defense.
Secondly, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. 7 To bar
an assessment, the taxpayer in Munter would have had to raise the is-
sue.3' It is unlikely that an affirmative defense raised by the taxpayer
would have been completely ignored by the Tax Court, the circuit court,
and the Supreme Court. These alternate rationales most likely explain
why the Supreme Court opinion in Munter did not discuss the statute of
limitations issue.
In addition to the weakness of authority cited by the Supreme Court,
the "assessment" rationale conflicts with Congress' intent in enacting sec-
tion 6037. As noted earlier," at the time section 6037 was enacted it
applied to only two organizations: C corporations that filed S corporation
returns pursuant to an invalid S election, and S corporations that filed S
corporation returns pursuant to a valid election. Although one goal of
section 6037 was to clarify the application of the statute of limitations to
S corporations that file an S corporation return pursuant to an invalid
election, it also applies to S corporations that file a return pursuant to a
valid S election and do not owe a corporate level tax. The only purpose
for making the statute of limitations applicable to an S corporation that
is not subject to tax is to provide a statute of limitations to the share-
holders of the corporation through which the S corporation items flow.
The "assessment" rationale of the Second Circuit and the broad interpre-
tation of the Supreme Court language in Bufferd violates the congressio-
nal intent of section 6037.
A more significant objection to the "assessment" rationale of the Sec-
ond Circuit is its effect upon the concept of a statute of limitations. The
purpose of a statute of limitations is to provide some assurance that at
some point records may be safely discarded.' If the Service may adjust
returns without assessment at any time, the taxpayer disposes of old re-
cords at his own risk. This is especially true for any tax attributes that
are carried over from year to year. Consistent with the broad interpreta-
tion of the language of the Supreme Court opinion in Bufferd, the Ser-
vice could make an adjustment without assessment to any item on a tax
return for which the statute of limitations has expired. That adjustment,
in turn, may affect a tax attribute in a year currently open under the stat-
327. MERTENS, supra note 99, § 57.97 (citing Talbot Walker v. Commissioner, 27
B.T.A. 829 (1933)).
328. Id.
329. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
330. Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1989).
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ute of limitations for which the Service makes a contemporaneous as-
sessment. The taxpayer is forced to show that the adjustment made in
.the prior year, which now affects current income tax liability, is errone-
ous. If the Second Circuit's concept of an adjustment without assessment
becomes the law, the assurance offered by a statute of limitations provi-
sion becomes severely diminished.
While the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and those who agree
with their opinions in Bufferd may try to limit the "assessment" rationale
to the case of S corporations that do not pay tax, this is not possible. Re-
solving the issue of how the statute of limitations applies to S corpora-
tions and their shareholders by interpreting the word "assessment" in
section 6501(a), requires that the rationale be applied to all returns sub-
ject to the provisions of section 6501(a). The Supreme Court leaves open
the possibility that adjustments without assessments may be made to the
returns filed by any taxpayer after the statute of limitations has ex-
pired.33
C. The Policy Concerns
1. Overview
When examining the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Kelley v. Commission-
er," the circuit courts and the Tax Court assert that the holding in
Kelley rests primarily on policy considerations.' The Supreme Court in
Bufferd noted that policy concerns contributed to the decision reached
in Kelley.' While the Kelley opinion gives a thorough discussion of the
policy issues associated with the dispute under discussion,' the Ninth
Circuit did not begin to address those issues until it had analyzed the
statutory language of section 6037.' The Kelley court then followed the
discussion of policy concerns with an analysis of legislative history.1
7
Courts that have examined the Kelley opinion address the policy con-
cerns raised by the Ninth Circuit, but they do not indicate why the analy-
sis of the statutory language and legislative history also contained in that
331. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927, 932-33 n.11 (1993).
332. 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989).
333. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 1992); Fehlhaber v. Com-
missioner, 954 F.2d 653, 657 (11th Cir. 1992), offg 94 T.C. 863 (1990).
334. Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 931-32 n.10.
335. Kelley, 877 F.2d at 758.
336. Id..
337. Id. at 759.
opinion is flawed.' As shown above,' the interpretation given to the
relevant code sections by courts other then the Ninth Circuit is not as
logical as the Ninth Circuit's reasoned opinion on these issues."0
2. The Arguments
In Kelley, the Ninth Circuit expressed the idea that statutes of limi-
tation exist so that a taxpayer may confidently dispose of old corporate
records.u ' The court noted that the Service can easily request an exten-
sion of the limitations period if it so desires . 2 The Tax Court ad-
dressed the policy concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit as well as raising
some counter policy concerns of its own. 3 Other courts that have ex-
amined the issue have repeated the Tax Court's refutation of the Ninth
Circuit's policy arguments; however, they do not offer any new counter-
policy considerations."
The Tax Court responded to the Ninth Circuit's concerns with three
arguments:
1. Statutory construction to avoid perceived unfairness conflicts with the settled
rule that statutes of limitation are to be strictly construed.
2. It is not unusual for an individual's tax responsibility to be construed from the
book's of another entity.
3. Generally, there is only one shareholder in an S corporation."
The Tax Court's response to the policy concerns of the Kelley opinion
has some merit. A court's belief that a statute works unfairness on the
taxpayer should not control how it interprets the statute if such an in-
terpretation would conflict with the rules of statutory construction."
However, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of code section 6037 rests on statu-
tory language and legislative history; not policy considerations, which
simply support the conclusions already reached. 7
The second concern, that the individual taxpayer's liability often relies
on the books of another entity, is a point of some merit when evaluating
338. See Bufferd, 113 S. Ct. at 927; Green, 963 F.2d at 783; Fehlhaber, 952 F.2d at
653.
339. See supra notes 185-331 and accompanying text.
340. See Kelley, 877 F.2d at 756.
341. Id. at 758.
342. Id.
343. Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863, 970, affd, 954 F.2d 653 (1lth Cir.
1992).
344. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993), affg 952 F.2d 675 (2nd Cir.
1992); Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992); Fehlhaber v. Commis-
sioner, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992).
345. Fehlhaber, 94 T.C. at 870.
346. See supra notes 99-121 and accompanying text.
347. Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1989).
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the fairness arguments. However, as noted by the Tax Court, a fair result
should not be chosen if it is inconsistent with the result reached through
the application of the rules of statutory construction38 The courts exam-
ining the Kelley opinion should concern themselves with the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of the relevant statutory language and legislative
history. The third argument is an unsupported assertion of fact that
should not be given any consideration.
In addition to refuting the policy concerns of the Ninth Circuit, the
Tax Court raised concerns about the effects of the Ninth Circuit's inter-
pretation on the taxpayer and the Service.4 9 It is important to note,
however, that such policy concerns should not prevent the Tax Court, or
any other court, from first examining the statutory language and legisla-
tive history of the relevant code sections.' The first issue the Tax
Court raised related to a shareholder of an S corporation who failed to
file an individual return." The Tax Court was concerned that an indi-
vidual without a statute of limitations defense for his individual tax as-
sessment would receive the benefit of a three year statute of limitations
on the S corporation return and the items contained within it. 2 Con-
versely, the Tax Court was concerned about the scenario of the S corpo-
ration not filing a return. In that case, the Service's ability to make ad-
justments to the pass-through items of the S corporation would be gov-
erned by the limitations period on the individual's tax return.'
The concerns raised by the Tax Court about the unintended conse-
quences to the taxpayer and the Service caused by the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation are not problematic. The Tax Court's concern is how the
statute of limitations will be affected if only one return, either the
shareholder's or the S corporation's, is filed. In either situation, the cur-
rent rules can be satisfactorily applied.
If only the S corporation filed a return, the three year statute of limita-
tions would run as to the S corporation return, but no statute of limita-
348. Fehihaber, 94 T.C. 863, 870 (1990), affd, 954 F.2d 653 (1lth Cir. 1992).
349. Fehlhaber, 94 T.C. at 870.
350. See supra notes 99-121.
351. Fehlhaber, 94 T.C. at 870.
352. Fehlhaber, 94 T.C. at 870; see also I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) (1993). Section 6501(c)(3)
states: "In the case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceed-
ing in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any
time." Id.
353. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1993). See supra note 7 for text.
tions would run on the individual return.' The Service could fix the
assessment of the S corporation tax items by giving notice to the S cor-
poration or to the last known address of the shareholder. When the
shareholder paid his tax liability he would be charged for the S corpora-
tion items as the Service assessed them.
If the S corporation fails to file a return, but the shareholder files a re-
turn, the Service, as a practical matter, can find the individual and in-
quire about the corporate return." Regardless, the shareholder must
still include, the S corporation tax items on his return. If, by omitting the
S corporation tax items, the shareholder of the S corporation files a false
return with an intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed or collected
through the courts at any time.'
VI. CONCLUSION
After examining the statutory language 7 and the legislative histo-
ry' of the relevant code provisions, the reasoning used by the Ninth
Circuit in Kelley v. Commissioner" is more logical than the interpreta-
tions of these provisions made by the Supreme Court,'s the Fifth Cir-
cuit," the Eleventh Circuit, 2 and the Second Circuit.' The only al-
ternate analysis offered by these courts that supports the government's
position seriously infringes on the concept of a statute of limitations.'
The other interpretations offered by those courts that disagree with the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Kelley v. Commissioner fail to give effect to
language present in section 6037(a),an the congressional intent behind
the statute as derived from the legislative history," and the general pre-
sumption that S corporations should be treated as C corporations found
354. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) (1993). See supra note 352 for text.
355. Id.
356. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1) (1993). Section 6501(c)(1) states: "In the case of a false or
fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a pro-
ceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any
time." Id.
357. See supra notes 122-58 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 159-84 and accompanying text.
359. 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989).
360. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993).
361. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992).
362. Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653 (lth Cir. 1992)
363. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992).
364. See supra notes 306-31 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 185-256 and accompanying text.
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in section 1371(a). ' Following the better interpretation of the interac-
tion of sections 6037(a), 6012, and 6501(a), offered by the Ninth Cir-
cuit' and developed in this article,' the Service should be barred by
the statute of limitations from making assessments of tax attributable to
items reported on the S corporation return against shareholders of an S
corporation after the three year statute of limitations on the S corpora-
tion return expires.
367. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
368. Kelley, 877 F.2d at 756.
369. See supra notes 122-84 and accompanying text.

